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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
May 22, 1980 Conference
List 1, Sheet 1
No. 79-1380-ADX
HARRIS, Secy HEW

m ND ) 11. (Bua)

3~ Ct-~

v.
Federal/Civil

WILSON
1. SUMMARY:

u.s.c.

§

Timely

HEW appeals from an order of the DC holding 42

1382(e) (1) (A)-(B) unconstitutional insofar as it

e,xc i ud;; ~ divi__duals between the ages of 21 and 65 who reside
in public mental institutions from Supplemental Security Income
(SSI) benefits.

- 2 -

2. FACTS and STATUTORY BACKG ROUND:

This case involves

appellees' entitlement to a monthly $25 SSI payment normally
made to otherwise eligible persons residing in medical
institutions, but denied to appellees because they are
institutionalized in public mental health hospitals and are
between the ages of 21 and 65.

This payment is made to

eligible individuals for their personal

n~ eds

-- reading

material, non-institutional clothing, pay phones, toiletries,
and the like --and not for medical care, food, and shelter.
42

u.s.c.

§

1382(e) (1) (A) states that no person is eligible

for SSI benefits with respect to any month in which he is
inmate of a public institution.

Subsection (B), however,

--

states an exception to that exclusion where the individual
cA.-

...,...:....

resides in any health care facility receiving Medicaid payments ~
~------------------------------------.
.
with respect to that individual. Such individuals are entitled ~
to a limited payment of up to $25 a month.

~xcluded

~ot

does~

from these benefits because the Medicaid statute

cover inpatient hospital or skilled nursing home

~;; an

~

Appellees are

institution for tuberculosis or

services ~~

~s,

with

tw~

~~ns -- services for individuals over 65, and servic e s in

~a p~~ital for individuals
~ 1-9 1,3~(1)' (4)' (15)' (16).
~
/

under 21.

See 42

u.s.c.

Appellees filed a class action in the ND Ill. claiming that

the exclusion of aged, blind and/or disabled individuals from

./)

benefits received by other such individuals, simply because
they reside in public mental health institutions, violates
their rights to equal protection.

(A consolidate d action

challenged the exclusion of pretrial detaine es from the same
SSI benefits.)
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3. OPINION BELOW:

The DC denied relief to the pretrial

detainees, but held that the statute was unconstitutional as
/

applied to appellees.

Th~

DC first determined that appellees

7

were members of a "quasi-suspect" class because the statute
excluded them from coverage, in part, because they were
receiving treatment for

me~tal

illnesses.

The DC identified

sever a l indicia of suspect classes, including: whether the
does 1\ot .·classification bear a relation to ability to perform; whether

11

it defines a politically impotent, insular minority; whether it
defines a group that historically has been subject to unequal
treatment; and whether the characteristic is immutable and

frL

determined solely by accident of birth.

It concluded that the

mentally ill were politically powerless, had historically been
subjected to unequal treatment, and had received such treatment
because of a factor over which they have no control.

These

f equal
protection scrutiny to

· y -classification at issue,

requiring that it must be "reasonable, not arbitrary, and must
rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and
substantial relation to the object of the legislation."
(Quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
Based on an examination of SSI's legislative history, the
DC conclud,ed that the purpose of the stipend for residents of
public health institutions was to enable them to purchase
comfort items not provided by the institution.
articulated le "slative intent
health institutions from these

small ~

There was~ ~~

exclude residents of

mental ~

and the DC could

conceive of no reason why Congress would perceive that they

/_

rt:/~~

- 4 would not need such benefits.

(In contrast, th e legislative

reports did focus on the fact that inmates in penal
institutions would not be eligible for SSI.)
HEW asserted three justifications for the exclusion of
appellees from the SSI scheme.

~

~

The DC rejected them in turn.

it held that an interest in conserving federal resources

could not be served by making an invidious distinction between

classes of citizens.

~·

HEW argued t;,;t it wanted to

insure that federal funds were received on behalf of residents
living in qualified institutions.

it argued that

appellees were not similarly situated with Medicaid patients in
terms of federal interest and control because their
institutions were not receiving Medicaid payments on their
behalf.

With respect to both these arguments, the DC observed

5.51
that the SSI statute, as opposed · to ~edicaid, provided benefits ~ 4 ·f~
~1'-4/o
to the residents themselves, not to their institutions. The
t.u4t~;~~

exclusion of appellees from SSI appeared to have been an
accidental by-product of that statute's incorporation of

.- ~-'-

the ~

Medicaid eligibility scheme, rather than a purposeful decision
to provide payments only to residents eligible for Medicaid.
The DC concluded that the asserted governmental interests
served by this mental health classification were not of
sufficient importance to sustain the SSI exclusion, and granted
appellees summary judgment on their equal protection claim.
-tM..
4. CONTENTIONS: The SG contends that SSI classification at
1\

issue here is not based on mental health considerations, but on
eligibility for Medicaid benefits.

And he notes that the

exclusion from Medicaid coverage of persons aged 21 to 65

~

- 5 -

residing in mental institutions has been upheld against equal
protection attack.
(SONY), aff'd, 414

Legion v. Richardson, 354 F. Supp. 456

u.s. 1058 -(1973); Kantrowitz v. Weinberger,

388 F. Supp. 1127 (DC 1974), aff'd, 530 F.2d 1034 (CADC), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976).

The Medicaid exclusion was based

on Congress• belief that the health needs of individuals
residing in public institutions were being provided by the
states.

The SSI exclusion was based on the same belief.

The

SG recognizes that the broad exclusion is riddled with
exceptions, but he states that there is nothing in the
legislative record to suggest that Congress created the
classification at issue here
upon an identifiable group.
Feeney, 442

11

because of 11 its adverse effects

(Citing Personnel Administrator v.

u.s. 256, 279 (1979).)

Assuming that the statutory scheme does not classify SSI
recipients on the basis of their mental health status, then it
need only serve some rational objective in order to satisfy
constitutional standards.

The SSI scheme is reasonable

it leaves to the states the responsibility of providing for the
needs of persons in public mental health hospitals.

Even

assuming that the statutory scheme does classify recipients on
the basis of their mental health, the SG quarrels with the DC's
conclusion that such a classification must satisfy middle-tier
equal protection scrutiny.

Mental illness is not an immutable

characteristic, and it is directly related to an individual's
ability to perform in society.
70 4, 711 (CA3 1979)
class) •

See Doe v. Colautti, 592 F.2d

(the mentally i 11 are not a suspect

5~

because ~

- 6 -

th e re ~

Appellees have filed a motion to affirm, arguing that

~

is no substantial question presented here warranting plenary
review.

They emphasize that Congress never articulated a

reason for excluding appellees' class from the SSI program.
The available legislative reports in fact indicate that
Congress believed it was providing for monthly $25 payments to
the residents of all medical institutions.
Second, it is true that some mental patients (those
residing in private institutions, or those under 21 and over
65) receive SSI benefits, but the fact remains that appellees
health
status.
..........

-...

Third, the SG's contention that appellees are excluded

from SSI because they are excluded from Medicaid is untenable
Jll

\.)

)?~~
~

-- residents of private mental hospitals are excluded from
Medicaid, but they receive SSI payments.

The exclusion of

appellees from SSI was fortuitous -- the accidental

result ~

the interaction of two complex statutes.
Fourth, that the exclusion of appellees' class from

~

s-..s I

hL.-~

-

~ '"'

,~ ~

Medicaid payments has been affirmed as constitutional does not
dictate a like result with respect to the SSI exclusion.

The ~

~
Medicaid exclusion for residents of mental hospitals was based~

on congressional reluctance to fund extremely expensive
institutional care for the mentally ill, a function
traditionally served by the states.

~5""5;

The purpose of SSI is to

provide subsistence grants for non-medical costs on a uniform
national basis.

'-------.....

Congress' concern about directly subsidizing

mental institutions through Medicaid has no bearing on the
denial of SSI benefits for patients' personal needs not met by
the institutions' provision of food, shelter, and medical care.

- 7 -

Fiscal concerns cannot justify this invidious legislative
discrimination.

Moreover, the government's fiscal interest in

this case is insubstantial.

While the SG asserts that the

annual cost of paying SSI to appellees' would be about $95
million, see j.s. at 7 n.8, a more realistic estimate would be
about $6 million, or 0.1% of the annual total cost of SSI.
All of these arguments indicate that the exclusion of
appellees from SSI is not even rationally related to any
legitimate governmental purpose.

A summary affirmance here

will not affirm the DC's application of heightened scrutiny to

7

....._..:.....-

classifications based on mental health.

Nonetheless, the DC's

------

use of middle-tier scrutiny in this context was correct.

It is

perverse for the government to argue that the mentally disabled
are not deserving of special judicial protection when the
program at issue was designed to compensate for the inability
of its beneficiaries to perform or contribute to society, and
the exclusion of appellees from that program will prolong or
intensify their disabilities.
~. DISCUSSION:

Appellees make a persuasive case in arguing

that their exclusion from SSI was not based on a conscious
congressional desire to benefit only those residents of medical
institutions that are also eligible for Medicaid.

I tend to

~l.;t

agree with the DC's conclusion that the exclusion of appellees
from the SSI program was the accidental effect of the
~

interaction of the SSI statute with the Medicaid statute.
However, for that very reason, it is difficult for appellees to
maintain that their exclusion from SSI was invidious.

While I

believe that appellees' exclusion from SSI was irrational when

- 8 viewed in the light of that program's purposes, I am not
certain that this Court should reach that conclusion
summarily.

A summary affirmance here would seem to be unwise

for two additional reasons.

First, confusion might result from

a comparison of this case with the Court's past affirmance in
Legion.

Second, a summary affirmance could be read as

approving the DC's holding that the mentally ill are a
quasi-suspect class, a conclusion that seems deserving of
plenary review.
I recommend a NOTE.

There is a motion to affirm.
Murphy
(
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BENCH MEMORANDUM
TO:

Mr. Justice Powell

FROM:

Peter Byrne

DATE:

November 30, 1980

RE:

No. 79-1380, Harris, Sec'y

v. Wilson

Question Presented
Does

42

Protection Clause,

u.s.c.

§

16ll(e) (1)

because it excludes

violate

from

the

Equal

the provision of

.'

'

2.

Supplemental

Security

Income

payments

persons

otherwise

eligible who reside in public mental health institutions?

I

This appeal is before the Court because a federal DC
(Bua,

ND

Ill)

held

16ll(e) (1) (B)

§

unconstitutional.

The

DC

reached this consclusion by holding that the statute classifies
on

the

basis

disablities

of
are

classification

mental
a

is

health,

that

"quasi-suspect"

not

persons

class,

substantially

with

and

related

to

mental

that

an

the

important

legislative objective. The SG disputes the premise of the DC's
decision;

he

argues

that

the

statute

does

not

discriminate

S6against the mentally handicapped, but draws a classification on
A ~'--------------------the basis of whether residents of public institutions are

~~----------------------------------------eligible
for Medicaid
benefits. The SG argues further that this
classification

has

constitutional

under

a

rational

determin~hat

an~hether ~hat

draws,

and

is,

therefore,

the Equal Protection Clause.

this case it is necessary to
statute

basis

To analyze

classification the

classification

survives

the

appropriate level of judicial scrutiny.
The
provides
aged,

Supplemental

monthly

blind,

or

cash

Security

payments

disabled.

to

Section

Income

(SSI)

indigent

persons

16ll(e)

provides

program
who
that

are
no

person shall be eligible for SSI payments who "is an inmate of
a

public

institution."

Section 16ll(e) (1) (B)

then creates an

exception
from
this
prohibition;
an
otherwise
eligible
.:=:---.........
w-t.o
individual in a public health care facility t ,b:m: is receiving

3.

Medicaid benefits on his account is entitled to receive limited
SSI payments of $25 per month. A significant group whose health
care is excluded from Medicaid coverage is persons between ages
21

and

65

concede

who

are

that

this

constitutional,
354 F.Supp.
../ Legion v.

in

public

distinction

Appellees

456

mental

brief

institutions.

in

Medicaid

at 17.

Appellees

-

coverage

Leg ion v.

, is

Richardson,

(S.D.N.Y.) (three judge court), aff'd sub nom .

Weinberger,

414 U.S.

1058

(1973).

But appellees do

argue that the distinction is unconstitutional in the provision
of

SSI

benefits.

Congress's

The

recognition

Medicaid
that

exclusion

is

justified

by

the provision of services to the

mentally disabled in public institutions is a traditional state
function.
first

issue

is

what

classification

does

the

Not all mentally disabled persons are denied SSI
mental
render

a

person

illness

eligible

for

Mental~atients

1382c(3) (A).

is

SSI
who

a

disability

benefits.

do

not

42

reside

that

can

u.s.c.
in

§

public

institutions or whose treatment in such institutions is covered
by Medicaid receive at least some SSI
disabled

person

institutionalized

was
in

not

private

benefits~f · the mentally
institutionalized,~ was

facility,

(!l)

or

was

resident

public "group horne" or halfway house containing less
residents,

r

he

-

would

receive

full

SSI

benefits

if

in

a

than 16

otherwise

eleigible. If he were in a public general health care facility
receiving

Medicare

funds

to

pay

the

costs

of

treating

the

[_ mental illness, or if he were younger than 21 or older than 65

l;

4.

and in a public mental hospital, , he would receive the limited
$25

per

month

from SSI

SSI

payment.

benefit~bersons

lI);.\~ es1. d en t s

.
1n

bl.1c
pu "'

Conversely,

the

statute

excludes

suffering from no mental disablitiy:

t u b ercu 1 os1s
.

.
(5':)res1.d en t s
san1't ar1ums,

.
1n

public medical institutions in states with a 21 day limitation
on benefits,

an~Jrsons

in unlicensed private facilities.

Given this framework, it is difficult to say that the
statute draws a classification on the basis of mental illness.
Appellees argue,

that because persons between 21 and

however,

65 who reside in public general hospitals receive SSI benefits,
the distinction that prevents the provision of SSI benefits to
appelleesis the modifier "mental". A statute that excluded from
similar benefits 22-64 year old residents of public hospitals
for

women

Moreover,

would

create

the fact

a

gender-based

classififcation.

that not all mental patients are excluded

from benefits does not lessen the fact that those injured are
mental

patients.

See

Nyquist

v.

Mauclet,

432

u.s.

1,

7-9

(1977).

This

argument

has

some

appeal

if

the

question

is

looked at technically and myopically. However, Nyquist, as the
SG

notes,

suspect
nonmental

is
class

were

patients

importantly,
strained.

inapposite,

the

injured
are

nature

____

Some

because
by

also
of

the

mental
_____.....,
patients

there
the
denied

only

members

classification:
the

benfits.

classification
receive

of

argued

benefits,

some

the
here
More

seems
non-

mental disadvantaged persons do not. The classification seems
to turn on the traditional source of funding that the treatment

2

5.

involved here has received.
the

malady

from

the

It is artificial

means

of

treating

it,

to separate out
when

the

statute

requires both to be present for the benefits to be denied. As
this Court has said, "The proper classification for purposes of
equal protection analysis is not an exact science". Califano v.
Boles,
line

u.s.

443

282, 293

Congress

Medicaid
public
this,

intended

exclusion,

mental
and

(1979). Here, a fair reading of what

health

focuses

on

to

which

draw

is

directs

premised

institutions.

on

attention
state

The SSI

the source of

to

provision

exclusion

funding

the

that

of

follows

the

service

generally has. Thus, I think it artificial to say that Congress
drew the line on the basis of mental health.
If

the classification is not drawn on the basis of

mental disability, it is unnecessary to reach the question of
whether

such

classifications

require

judicial ~

heightened

scrutiny. This is a good result because there is almost no law
on this question.

There

is an emotional appeal to giving the

mentally disabled some special status in the Constitution: they
have

often

been

treated

shamefully

and

political power themselves. Nonetheless,
is

suspect

or

"quasi-suspect"

for

they

posseess

finding

purposes

little

that a class
of

the

Equal

Protection Clause contains a judgment that legislatures should
avoid

drawing

distinctions

as

to

the

class

in

general

legislation. The mentally disabled are in a real sense wards of
the

state

and

properly

should

be

special

subjects

of

legislation. Public consideration of their limitations require
that legislatures treat them differently than people at large .

.

.
'

6.
Thus,

it seems

inappropriate to subject classifications drawn

on mental health to heightened scrutiny.

. ~

TheA. quest ion

~

II

~w

rem a ~ w_h_e_t_h_ e_ r _ t_h_e__e_x_c_l_u_s_l_·o_n_ of

residents of public mental institutions has a rational basis.
To state this question in regard to a federal welfare measure
is perhaps
(1972)

to answer

it.

Jefferson v.

and Dandridge v. Williams,

Hackney,

397 U.S.

41

406

(1970)

u.s.

435

form the

perameters of the inquiry: the distinction drawn need have only
some rational basis.
"~

A.

Appellees argue with effect that the classification

1

~

is unwise and unfair.
incorporating

the

The basic constitutional claim is

limits

of

the

Medicaid

Act

into

that

the

SSI

program without regard to the different policies the two Acts
serve results in a classification that is irrational in terms
of the objectives of SSI. The appellees need the assistance of
SSI

to the same or greater extent than do all other eligible

recipients. They argue that a proper line in a welfare program
~

is

one

"necessitated

program."

by

the

nature

and

of

the

In support of this proposition, appellees cite

u.s.

Dep't of Agriculture v. Murray, 412 U.S. 508
Court

struck

irrebutable

down

a

Food

presumption.

Stamp
In

limitation

Murray,

you

purposes

(1973), where the
as

creating

joined

an

Justice

Rehnquit's dissent, which argued that the majority had deviated
unjustifiably from the Dandridge analysis. Thus, you probably
will not be persuaded by appellees

reliance on that case.

In

7.

any event,

there

~rrebutable

presumption.

The

is

no claim here that §

argues

SG

that

the

1611 (e)

classification

creates an

is

rational

because Congress could properly decide to provide benefits to
public

institution residents whose treatment was being funded

by Medicaid,

but

exclude

those

public

institution

residents

whose treatment is wholly funded by the state. Put another way,
the

classification

desire

to

avoid

basic

care

and

tate.

to

rationally

spending
treatment

Appellees

unrelated

is

respond

the

costs

related

federal
are
to
of

funds

already
this

care

that
and

to

the

legitimate

on

individuals

being

provided

the SSI

whose
by

the

benefits

are

treatment

provided

by

Medicaid.~-----~------------------------The
best, but I
the

Dandridge
limited

basis

urged

by

the

SG

is

tenuous

at ~

reluctantly conclude that it satisfies the limited

~

demands

rational

~-------------

Court

test.

SSI

may

As

program

place

appellees
for

upon

the

argue,

residents

of

~----~

legislature
the
any

under

structure
public

of

the
the

institution

suggests that the provision of $25 per month is in addition to
the costs of medical treatment met by Medicaid. That the state
provides the equivelent of Medicaid payments does not mean that
the

state also will provide the additional disposable

provided

by

the

limited

SSI

payment.

income

However,

the

classification could plausibly be read to encompass a judgment
that when the state provides the medical care for residents of
public

institutions,

it

is also the province of the state to

decide whether additional benefits should

be

provided

to

the

8.

r

inmate.
,....--..-- Congress must draw the line somewhere, and I cannot say
that this line is wholly lacking in any basis.
To lessen'

the harshness of this exclusion, Congress

provided that reidents of public mental

institutions who are

under 21 or over 65 would receive the limited benefit be~e
of

their

rise
doubt

to
on

special needs.
a

This

constitutional
the

rationality

distinction

problem,
of

the

but

in

itself

it does

basic

cast

does

not

further

classification.

It

recognizes that at least in cetain classes, state benefits are
insufficient. Nonetheless, I cannot say that the classification
is unconstitutionally irrational .

... .
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5 k ~ ..;.,_ )&·"4!44A4<•'" ~
/..c.?~~~

Mr. Justice Brennan

Mr. Justice Stewart

~

-------

·,

'

.

Mr. Justice White ~

~ .........~

Mr. Justice Marshall ~.

Mr. Justice Blackmun

~

ec.• ~ ....-z.,...c

Mr. Justice Powell ~

,J

~ .. <-~H·••d;;j r~~

~ 4,...-~~~~

Mr. Justice Rehnquist ~ ..-c::.. ~

I:

.

~

.

.§u:prmtt C!fourl o-f firt ~b .§tw,g1l'Ct$fri:n~ gl.
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE

w .. .

J. BRENNAN, JR.

RE:

Q}.

20,?)!.~

December 15, 1980

No. 79-1380 Harris v. Wilson

Dear Thurgood, Lewis and John:
We four were to affirm in the above.

Would you

Lewis be willing to undertake the dissent?
Since?Jly,

...
('
/? \.-l.
.

l

·-"7

Mr. Justice Marshall
Mr. Justice Powell
Mr. Justice Stevens

I

December 16, 1980

79-1380 Harris v. Wilson

Dear Bill:
I will be glad to undertake the dissent.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Brennan
lfp/ss
cc:

Mr. Justice Marshall
Mr. Justice Stevens

Peter: I suggest that you give priority to the draft on
your assigned Court opinion, and then tackle this dissent.
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'
States District Court for
'
the Northern District of
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Ill'mms.
.
/
t/'-'
Charles Edward W1lson et al.
·
[January - , 1981]
JusTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue in this case is whether Congress constitutionally
may decline to grant Supplemental Security Income benefits
to a class of otherwise eligible individuals who are excluded
institutionalized
because they are aged 21 through 64 and
in public mental institutions that do not receive Medicaid
funds for their care. The United States District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois held unconstitutional, under
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, that portion
of the Social Security Act, as amended, that excludes these
ot erwise el gible persons from the supplemental benefits.
rrhe Secretary of Health and Human Services has taken a
direct appeal to this Court under 28 U. S. C. § 1252.

are

I
In October 1972, Congress amended the Social Security Act
(Act) to create the federal Supplemeutal Security Income
program (SSI) effective January 1, 1974. 86 Stat. 1465, ~2
U. S. C. § 1381 et seq. This program was intended "[t]o
assist those who cannot work because of age, blindness, or
disability," S. Rep. No. 92-1230, p. 4 (1972) , by "set[ting] a
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Federal guaranteed minimum income level for aged, blind,
and disabled persons," id., at 12. 1
The SSI program provides a subsistence allowance, under
federal standards, to the Nation's needy aged, blind, and
disabled. 2 Included within the category of "disabled" under
the program are all those "unable to engage in any substant;al
gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment which call be expected to
result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last
for a continuous period of not less than twelve months."
§ 1614 (a)(3)(A) of the Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1382c (a)(3)(A).
Although the SSI program is broad in its reach, its coverage
is not complete. :From its very inception, the program has
excluded from eligibility anyone who is an "inmate of a
public institution." § 1611 (e) (l)(A) of the Act, as amended,
42 U. S. C. § 1382 (e)(1) (A) .u Also from the program's inception, Congress has made a partial exception to this ex1

The Supplemental Security Income program, Title XVI of the Social
Security Act, largely replaced the prior system of federal grants to state-.
run U&>istance programs for the aged, blind, and d'sabled col"tained in
Title;; I, X, XIV, and XVI of the Act, that is, Old Age Assistance, 49
Stat. 620, a:; amended, 42 U.S. C.§ 301 et seq.; Aid to the Blind, 49 Stat.
645, as amended, 42 U. S C. § 1201 et seq.; Aid to the Permanently and
Totally Disabled, 64 Stat. 555, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1351 et srq. ,·
and Aid to the Aged, Blind, or Disabled, 76 Stat. 197 , 42 U. S. C. § 1381
et seq. (1970 ed.). See Califano v Aznavorian, 439 U. S. 170, 171 (1978);
Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S . 1, 2 (1978) .
2 To be eligible for SSI benefits, a person must be "aged," that is, 65
or older, or "blind/' or "disabled," as tho:;£> terms are defined in § 1614
of the Act, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1382c, and his income and resources
mut>t be below the levels specified in §lOll (a), as amended, 42 U. S. C.
§ 1382 (a) .
8 Section 1611 (e) (l)(A), as amended, provides :
" (e) Limitation on eligibility of certain individuals
" (l)(A) Except as provided in :subparagraph (B) and (C), no perscn
shall be an eligible individual or eligible spouse for purp :-~ses of this subchapter with respect to any month if throughout such mouth he is all
Inmate of a public institution.''
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elus-ion by !Jroviding a small amount of money (not exceeding
$300 per year) to any otherwise eligible person in ((a hospital,
extended care facility, nursing home, or intermediate care
facility receiving payments (with respect to such individual
or spouse) under a State plan approved under· subchapter
XIX fMedicaid] ... " § 1611 (e)(l)(B), as amended, 42
U. S. C. § 1382 (e)(l)(B). 1 Congress thus, while excluding
1 Section 1611 (e)(l} (B), as amended, modifying § 1611 (e) (l)(A), as
amended, states:

"(B) In any ca~e where an elig:ble individual or his e'igible sr-ouse (if
any) is, throughout any month, in a hospital, extended care facility, nursing hornt', or intermediate care fa!!ility receiving paym::nts (with resper t
1o surh individual or spouse) under a State plan approvc•d under title
XIX, the benefit under this title for ::;uch individual for such month ~>hall
be payable"(i) at a rate not in excess of $300 per year (reduced by the amount
of any income not excluded pursuant to section 1612 (b)) in the case of an
individual who does not have an eligible spouse;
"(ii) in the eas" of an individual who has an elig:ble spouse, if only one
of them is in such a hospitlll, home or facility throughout ruch month, at
a mte not in excess of the sum of" (I) the rate of $300 per y!:'ar (redur~d by the amount of an} inrom!:',
not excluded pursuant to seetion 1612 (b), of the one who is in such
hosnital, hom!:', or facility), and
" (II) the applicable rate ,;pecified in subsection (b) ( 1) (reduced by
t he amount of <1DY income, not excluded punmant to ~-ection 1612. (b), of
the ot hPr); and
"(iii) at a rate not in excess of $6'.)0 per year (reduced by the amount
of any in rome not excluded pursuant. to sectif'n 1G12 (b)) in the case of
an indiddual who has an Pli~rible spouse, if both of them arP in such a
ho:;pital, home. or facility throughout surh month."
Subsection (C) of § 1382 (e)(l), not implicated in this case, further
modifies § 1611 (e)(l)(A), as amend(•d, by providing:
"((') A:; usC'd in subparagraph (A), the term 'public institutbn' does not
inrlude a ymblicly operated eommunity r-esidPnce which serve::; no more
than Hi rel'idents "
Added in 1976 by Pub L . 94-566, § 505 (a), 90 Stat. 2686, this subsec~
tion met objections that § 1611 (e) impeded reform efforts to de-institu
tionalizr rert11in group::: of handicapJ)Cd individuals, such as the mentally
4

I

I
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generally any per~n residing in a public institution, explicitly
has tied eligibility for a reduced amount of SSI benefits to
residence in an institution receiving Med aid benefits or t e
care of the eligible indiyidual.
Appellees brought this suit to challenge this resulting detail of Congress' having conditioned the limited assistance
grant on eligibility for Medicaid: a person between the ages
of 21 through 64: who resides in a public mental institution
is not eligible to receive this small stipend, even though that
person meets the other eligibility requirements for SSI benefits, because treatment in a public mental institution for a
person in this age bracket is not funded under Medicaid. 5
retarded. Congress determined to encourage the establishment of staterun group homes for such people by making residents in these institutiors
eligible for SSI benefits. See S. Rep No. 94-1265, p. 29 (1976); H. R.
Conf. Rep. No. 94-1745, pp. 27-28 (1976) .
'5 Federal funds are available under the Medic-aid program to pa.y for
the following "residential" services: "inpatient hospital services (other
than services in an institution for tuberculosis or mental diseases)," § 1905
(a)(l), 42 U. S. C. § 1396d (a)(l); "skilled nursing facility services
(other than services in an institution for tuberculosis or mental diseases)
for individuals 21 years of age or older," § 1905 (a) (4) (A); "inpatient
hospital services, skilled nur~ing facility services, and intermediate care
facility services for individl.)als 65 years of age or over in an institution
for tuberculosis or mental diseases," § 1905 (a) (14); "intermediate care
facility services (other than such services in an institution for tuberculosis
or mental diseases) for individuals . . . in need of such care," § 1905 (a.)
(15); certain ''inpatient psychiatric hospital services for individuals under
a~e 21," §§ 1905 (a)(16) and (h) . Subsection (17)(B) of § 1905 (a),
which provides for funding of any other medical or remedial care recognized under state law, specifically excludes "payments with respect to
care or servicff> for any individual who has not attained 65 years of age
and who is a patient in an institution for tuberculosis or mental diseases."·
In 1950, when it first ena.cted federal grunts for medical assistance, Congress excluded "any individual who ii:! a patient in an "institution for ...
mental diseases" from eligibility. 64 Stat 558. This exclusion was incorporated into the Medicaid statute in 1965, 79 Stat.. 352, but exceptions
were made for the needy aged in mental iu~titutions, and for the care of
~t1t~iL1ly ill pt>t:SOml
general ll\erli..cal Ja.cj}jties. Ibid. In 1972, in the-

m
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Appellees attack this statutory classification as violative of
the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment's
Due Process Clause.11 Their challenge, successful in the Dis~
trict Court, is two-fold. First, they argue that the exclusion
of their class of mentally il1 (and therefore disabled) persons
bears no rational relationship to any legitimate objective of
the SSI program. They assert, in fact, that their class was
excluded inadvertently because of its political powerlessness.
Brief for Appellees 6, 32. Second, they insist that because the
statute classifies on the basis of mental illness, a factor that
· greatly resembles other characteristics that this Court has
found inherently "suspect" as a means of legislative classi~
fication, specia.J justification should be required for the con~
gressional decision to exclude appellees,

II
'This case has had a somewhat complex procedural history.
It initially Wa$ instituted in December 1973 as a class action
for injunctive and declaratory relief to challeuge the federal
and Illinois assistance schemes that prevailed prior to the
effective date of the ssr program. See Wilson V. Edelman,
542 F. 2d 1260, 1263-1266 (CA7 1976). The then existing
state assistance program, for which federal funds were received, excluded from eligibility auy person who was residing
in a public mental or tuberculosis institution or who was conbill ell!tcting the SSI program, Congress further broadened Medicaid benefits :for the mentally ill to include most children in mental institutions.
86 Stat. 1461. A Senate proposal for demonstration pwjecl$ to invesrtiga.le the possibility of extending Medicaid benefits to the mentaJly ill between t.he ages of 21 through 64 in m~>ntal ho~pitals
e eated at. that
time, See S. Rep. No. 92-1230, p . 281 (1972); H. R. Conf. Rep. No.
92-1605, p. 65 (1972) .
6 This Court repeatedly has lwld that. the Fifth Amendment imposes
on t.he Federal Government the same standard required of state legisla.t.ion by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment See,
e. g., Weinberge1· v. Salji, 422 U. S. 749, 768-770 (1975); Riclta.rrlson v.
Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 81 (1»71).
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fined in a penal institution. !d., at 1263, n. 2. The plaintiffs later amended their complaint to include a challenge to
the SSI exclusion, which by then had come into effect. ld.,
at 1266. A three-judge court was convened under 28 U.S. C.
§§ 2281 and 2282 (1970 ed.) (since repealed by Pub. L. 94381, §§ 1 and 2, 90 Stat. 1119). The case was consolidated
witb another that challenged the exclusion from SSI benefits
of any pretrial detainee. Relying on Weinberger v. Salfi,
422 U.S. 749 (1975), the court granted the Secretary's motion to dismiss both cases for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that the p1aiutiffs had failed to exhaust the
administrative remedies provided for by § 1631 ( c)(3) of the
Act. as amended, 42 U S. C. § 1383 (c)(3). See 542 F. 2d,
at 1267- 1268.7
On appeal, appellees abandoned their claims under the pr:or
federal statutes. ld., at 1271. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the dismissal, holding that the Secretary had waived any requirement of exhaustion by her submission of the case to the District Court for
summary disposition. 8 !d., at 1272. Because the plaintiffs
had dropped their request for injunctive relief, the case was
remanded to the single-judge District Court. ld., at 1269.
7 The three-judge court also found that the state statute classified on the
basis of age, not menta! health, a.nd that it was rational and constitutional.
The Court of Appeals declined to review that. constitutional holding on the
ground tha.t review from the three-judge court could be had only in this
Court. Wilson v. Edel11Uln, 542 F . 2d, at 1276-1282.
8 The Court of Appeals also held that. only two of the named pla.intiffs,
Maudie Simmons and John Kiernan 'I'urney, had sati~:>1ied the minimum,
nonwaivable requirement of 42 U. S. C . § 4{)5 (g) that a party may seek
review only o£ a "final deci::;iou of the Secret.ury" denying, terminating, or
su::;pending U('!Jefits under the SSI jJrcgram. The other named plaintiff~,
including Charlet> Wilson, were eligiblE' for, or had sought. and been denied,
beneiiti! only tmder the prior cooperative ~tate-federal prograrru;, and
therefore they were dJt>mJssed as partie:>. We have retained W1lson as a
named party in the caption of this ca~:>e , however, as tlid the DistricL
Court on ren1und 1 for the ,;ake of unifonnity.
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That court, on remand, certified the class 9 and granted appellees' motion for summary judgment, holding that § 1382
(e)'s exclusion of the class members violated the equal protection guarantees of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. 478 F. Supp. 1046 (ND Ill. 1979).10 The District Court reasoned that the statute "creates three classifications: (1) age, and (2) residence in a public, (3) mental health
hospital." !d., at 1050. It ruled that Congress' use of the
first two factors need be justified only by demonstration of
their "rational relationship" to "a legitimate state interest."
Ibid. Under that standard, these classifications withstood
scrutiny. Congress' use, however, of a "mental health" classification was deemed to require a closer examination because
"mental health classifications possess the significant indicia of
the suspect classifications recognized in other cases." Id., at
1052. Although recognizing that the mentally ill as a group
do not demonstrate all the characteristics this Court has considered as denoting inherently suspicious classificatious, such
as race and national origin,t 1 the District Court believed that
The class was defined as:
''all personti residing in HEW Region V who have been terminated from
benefits under Title XVI, or who lmve applied for Supplemental Security
Income benefits under Title XVI and have l>een denied such benefits, on
or after January 1, 1974, solely because they are between the ages of 21
and 65 and hospitalized iu a public mental in::;titution." App. to Juri::; .
Statement 21a.
10 The District Court denied, however, the elaim of the pretrbl dehlinees
to the monthly stipend, applying a " rational rPlation" standard and finding the exclu8ion rational l>ecuuse ''[t]he detainee status is necessarily
tempomry in naturP, and the [Secretary] could legitimately wish to withhold these extra-sub~i:;tenee payments while the detainee is housed in a
public institution and until his future Htat us is d<•terruined ." 478 F . Supp.,
at 1055.
11 The Dit;trict Court uoted that a person's mental health prob~em ,
especially one that has led to institutionalization, io likely to "'bear a]
relation to ability to perform or contribute to ~ociety.'" !d .. at 10.511052, quoting FrpntiPro v. Richardson, 411 U S. 677, 68() (1973). The
court a1~o arknowledged that "[i]t is ddlfltable whether and to w14at
9

r

'.
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the mentally ill were "a politically impotent, insular minority''
that "have been subject to a 'history of unequal protection.' "
1b,id. The court therefore concluded that Congress could
legislatively disfavor the mentally ·m, as § 1611 (e) did, only
if the statutory classification passes an · "intermediate level of
judicial scrutiny," id., at 1053, that is, only if the "classification bears a substantial relation" to the object of the legislation evaluated "in.1ight of the primary purpose" of the scheme
o.f which it is a part. Ibid. The court a·djudged that the
"primary purpose" of the small monthly stipend was to
enable the needy to purchase comfort items not provided by
the institution. "·Rejecting the Secretary's proposed justifications for the exclusion, 12 the District Court held that the
classification could not withstand scrutiny. ·The legislative
history, it said, revealed no intent to exclude appellees' class;
the court could conceive of no upossible unexpreEsed purpose
for the exclusion"; and the court reasoned that "aged, blind
and disabled inmates of all public institutions would have
similar needs." Ibid. Upon the Secretary's direct appea1
from this judgment, we noted probable jurisdiction. (1980).

u.s.-

III
A

'fhe equal protection obligation impo8ed by the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendmeu t is uot an obligation to provide
the best governance possible. This is a necessa.ry result of
differe11t institutional competences, and its reasons are obviextent the mental illness is an 'innnutable chara.cteristic determined solely
by the accident of birth.) )j 478 .F. Supp ., at 1052, again quoting Frontie1'0, 411 U. S., at, 6'86'.
12 The Secretary argued that the statutory exclu:;iou has thn·e purposes:
" 1) the cont~ervation of federal resource::; ; 2) the concern that federal funds
be received on behalf of residents of qualified institutions; and 3) the fact
that plaintiffs a.re not 'similarly situated' with Medicaid patients in tet:.tW3
of fc®ral intereSt i\Jld control." 478 F. SttJ.JIJ.1 ut 105.).
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ous. Unless a statute employs a classificatiori that is; i1~h~r
e11tly invidious or that impinges on fuudame11ta1 rights, are,as
in which the judiciary then has a duty to interv~ne \n the.
democratic process, this Court properly exercises only, a li,mit:eu
1-eview power over Congress. the appropriate repre~en ta~!v~."
body through which the public makes democratic choice;:;.,
among alternative solutions to social and economic problems._.
See San Antonio School Di.strict v. Rodrig-uez, 411 U. S. 1
(1973). At the minimum level, this Court cousistently has
required -that legislation classify the persous it affects in a
manner rationally related to legitimate governmental objectives. See, e. g., Dandridge v. Wilfiams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970);
Mathews v. DeCastro, 429 U.S. 181 (1976). Appeliees assert
that the particular graut of federal beuefits under review
here, however. should "be subjected to a heightened standard
of review," Brief for Appellees 39, because the mentally .ill
"historically have been subjected to purposeful uuequar treatment; they have been relegated· to a position of political
powerlessness; and prejudice against them curtails their participation iu the pluralist system and strips theui ()f political
protection agaiust discriminatory legislation." (Footnote
omitted:) ra., at 41: .
We have 110 ocasion to reach this issue b~cause we -conclude
that this statute does not classify directly. on the basis of
mental healthY The SSI prograiri disti11guish.es an}ong .three
groups of persous, all of whom meet the basic eligibility requiremeuts. Persons 110t iu a "public institution" may receive full benefits; persons in a "public institutio11" of a certain nature ("hospital, extended care facility, nursing home,
or intermediate care facility receiving ')Jaymeuts (with reS'pect
to s·uch individual) . . . under [Medicaid]" ( empl1asis
added)', '§ 1611 (e) (1) (B) may receive rt>duced benefits; aud
13 We therefor£> intimate no vil'W H<> lo what ~1awlard of review applies
t.n1lt-gHl[t:ion .Cxprrt>sly ~lfa,.::sifying -tlw mruHtlly ill al:. n discrete· group, •
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persons in any other "publie institution" may not receive any
beuefits, The statute does not isolate the mentally ill or
subject them, as a discrete group, to special or subordihate
treatment. At the most, this legislation incidentally denies
a smalJ monthly comfort benefit to a certain number of persons suffering from mental illness; but in so doing it imposes
equivalent deprivation on other groups who -are not mentally
ill, while at the same tiwe benefiting substantial numbers
of the mentally ill.
'rhe group thus singled out for special treatment by § 1911
(e) does not entirely exclude the menta1ly ill. In fact, it
includes, in a sizable proportion to the total population receiving SSI benefits, large numbers of menta1ly i11 people.' 1
Further, the group excluded is not congruent with appellees>
14 Social Secmity Admini::;trution statistics show tha.t 30.7% of all blind
and disabled a.dult personl:l awa.rded SSI benefits in 1975 ( 109,509 per'l:lons)
were deemed dhlt1hled by meutal di::;orders, and t11e Adminitltration has conrluded that "rmJental illnetltl was the most. common cause of diHability
in 1975 ., Koehhar; Blind and DisalJJea Pet'l:lons Awarded Federally Administered SSI P<Lyment::;, 1975, Social Security Bulletin 10, 15 (June
1979). Half of thitl number ::;ulfered from mental illue::;,.; rather than mental retardation, and these ::~tatibtic::; did not incluue any pcrl:lons with prior
E>ntitlernent to benefits. Ibid.
Funher, as a recent study also 'indicates, a. substantial number of mentally ill people in in:>titutions actually receive SSI benE>fits. Represen taive Puymeut:; under the SSI Program, Augul:lt, 1977, Social Security Administration, Hesearch and Statil:ltic::; Note No. 9, Septemuer 16, 1980.
Thi::> ~tud) established tb<et 15% of tlw total population receiving SSI
Lenefitl:l (for all real:lons, inc1uding age, bliudue::;s, und disability) had
"repre::~entatiw payees" (a pen;on "appointed to malluge the benefit,; of !Ul
adult beneficiary" because of ''tl1e adult beueficiary'b inability to manage
hi::; own fund,.;" ) . ld., at 1. Out of a total of 184,103 institutionalized
persons who were reeeiving SSI benefits in August 11Y77 thro11gh ~'Uch
"repre~enta.tive payee::~," 76,494. or approximately 41%, were institu1.ionaJized beca.u;,;e of mental disorderl:l. !d., al 7 (Table 6) a11d 2 (Table 1) .
Tim::~, even on thb incomplete Jata, a ::;izaLle numurr of prrtlent SSI
rcripiet1ts were person;; in~titutionalized for meutnl iUue::;s.
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class. Among those excluded are the inmates of any other
nonmedical "public institution," such as a pris011, other penal
institution, and any other publicly funded residential program
the State may operate; 15 persons residing in a tuberculosis
institution; and residents of a medical institution not certified
as a Medicaid provider. 10 Although not by the same subsection, Congress also chose to excludP. from SSI eligibility
persons afflicted with alcoholism or drug addiction and not
undergoing treatment, § 1611 (e)(3)(A), and persons who
speud more than a specified time outside the United States,
§ 1611 (f). See Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170 (1978)
(upholding constitutionality of§ 1611 (f); Califano v. Torres,
435 U. S. 1 (1978) (upholding constitutiomi1ity of Congress'
exclusion from SSI eligibility of residents of Puerto Rico).
Thus, in § 1611 (e), Congress maae a distinction uot between
the mentaJly ill and a group composea of nomnentally ill, but
between residents in public institutions receiving Medicaid
funds for their care and residents in such institutions not
receiving Medicaid funds.
To the extent that the statute has an indirect impact upon
the mentally ill as a subset of publicly institutioualized persons, this record certainly presents no statistical support for a
contention that the mentally ill as a class are burdened dis·
proportionately to any other class affected by the Classification.
'The exclusion draws a line only between groups composed
(in part) of mentally ill individuals: those in public mental
hospitals, and those Hot in public mental hospitals. These
15 Appellees appear to concede the l'Mtionality of Congre:;.':>' general exclusion of ]mullcly in:;titutionalized per:>on:; from full SSI benefits.
10 An otherwi:;e t'ligible person does not. receive SSI benefits if he ·is
receiviug long-term tr<,atmt'nt in a medical facility that. i::~ not certified
nuder Mrdicaid standard:; as a providt'r SPe § 18()1 of the Act, 42
U. S C. § 1395x These ~Stnct ~Standarlis exclude many facilities but work
to the ultimate benefit of tho:;e receiving Medicaid Cf. O'Bamwn v. 'l'ow.n

'Court Nursing Cenla, -

U. S. -

(1980) ,
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groups are shirt,ing in population, anu members of one group
can, aud often do, pass to the other g;roup. 17
We also note that appellees have failed to produce any
evidence that C.ong,ress had a deliberate intent to uiscriminate
agaiust the mentally ill. Appellees admit that no such evidence exists; i11deed, they rely on the absence of explicit
iutent as proof of Congress' "inattention" to their needs and,
therefore, its prejudice against them. Brief for Appellees 39.
As in Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972). the indirect
deprivation worked by this legislation upon appellees' class,
whether or not the Class is considered "suspect." does not without more move us to ·regard it with a heightened scrutiny.
Cf. Personnel Ad,miniStrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442
u. s. 256 (1979).
17 The average inpatient stay in public mental hospita.ls ·is sl10rt. Rc~
cently collected data for 1975 reveals an average t-:ta.y in sta.tr ami couuty
mental hospital~ of only 25.5 days. Witkin, Chamcteti&1ics of Adrni::;t;ions
to SelecteU M<•utal Health Facilities, 1975: An Anno1a1ed Book of Charts
and Tables, Naliohal Institute of Mental HraHh - , DHHS Publication
No. (ADM) 80-l005 (1981). This study alHo showed that. young and
elderly patfents had longer periods of stay Oum patien~s in tlw mi<ldle-age
group. Id., at - . The ra,pidity with whicl1 inpatiPnf::; ar<' rele~;;ed from
public institutions has increased ::;ine~· the 1950's. Tn 1971 75% of all
patients admit.ted to state mental hospitnl:;: werr released within the fir~t
three month:::., while 87% were released within th!' fit"Bt six months. Ozarin,
Uedick, & Taube, A Quarter Century of Psychiatric Care, 1950-1974: A
Stati:stical Review, 27 Hospital & Communi1~ · Psyehia.try 516 (1976) .
Data from the National Institute of M<·nta1 Health show that tlw proportion of "pu.tieut care episode~" (admi::;t;ions duriug n. ~·<'Hr plus residrnts
at the beginning of the year) attributable to iupatimt treatment n.t state
and county hospitals declitwd from 49% iu 1!:!55 to 9% in 1977. This
dram~ttir decrease in the percentage of person:-: admi11E·d 1o t.lll'::w hospital....
was paralleled by a growth in t.n•atmcnt through outpatient and community menta.! health h<'ihti~; that. pt>rcmtugl' grl'w from 23% in 1955 to
76% in 1977. Witkin, Trendt-: in Ptttienl Care Episode:; in MmtaJ He.<llth
Facihties, 1955-IH77, National Institute of Mcn1<tl Health, Mmtal H!•alth
Statistical Note 1'\o. 154, p . 3 (Septemlx•t' Hl80). At 1he same time, the
total number of " patient ca.rP episode~ " incr!'<lscd fomfold, from approximately 1.7million in 1955 to li 9 million ju 1V77. Id., al L
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B
Thus, the pertiuent inquiry js whether the classification
employed in § 1611 (e)(1 )(B) advauces legitimate legislative
goals in a rational fashion. The Court has said that, although
this rational basis standard is "uot a toothless oue," Mat hews
v. L-ucas, 427 U. S. 495, 510 (1976), it does not allow us to
substitute our personal notions of good public policy for those
of Congress:
"In the ·area of economics and social welfare, a State
[and correspondingly under the Fifth Amendment the
Federa1 Government] does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its
laws are imperfect. If the classification has some 'reasonable basis,' it does not offend the Coustitution simply
because the classification 'is not made with mathematical
nicety or because in practice it results iu some inequity.'
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 78."
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 485 (1970).
The Court also has said: "This inquiry employs a relatively
relaxed standard refl.ecti11g the Court's awareness that the
drawing of lines that create distinction~ is peculiarly a legisla..
tive task and an unavoitlable one. Per(ection in making the
necessary classifications is neither possible nor necessary."
Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. .Murgia, 427 U. S. 307,
314 (1976). See also Un-ited States Ra·ilroad Retirement Bd.
v. Fr·itz, U. S. (1980). As long as the classificatory
scheme chosen by Congress rationally advances a reasonable
and identifiable governmental objective, we must disregard
the existence of other methods of allocatiOn that we, as individuals, perhaps would have
erred.
We believe that the decision to incorporate the Medicaid
eligibility standards into the SSl scheme must be considered
Congress' deliberate, cousidered choice. The legislative record, .although sparse, appears to he unequivocal. )3oth Hoy~e
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and Senate Reports on the iuitial SSI bill noted the exclusion
in uo uncertain terms. The House Report stated~
"People ~ho are reside1'1ts of certain public institutions,
or hospitals or nursing homes which are getting Medicaid
funds, wo~ld get ~enefits of up to $25 a mouth (reduced
by nonexcluded income). For these people most subsistence needs are met by the iustitution and full benefits are not needed. '- ome payrnent to these people,
though, would be needed to enable them to purchase
small comfort items not supplied by the institution. No
assistance benefits will be paid to an individual iu a penal
institution." H. R. Rep. No. 92-231, p. 150 (1971 ).
The Senate Report followed the House's language almost identically. See S. Rep. No. 92-1230, p. 386 (1972). We find
these passages, at the very least, to be a clear expression of
Congress' understanding that the stipend grant was to be
limited to a group smaller than the total population of otherwise eligible, institutionalized people. 'rhat the bill's sectiou-by-sectioll analysis contained in the House Report laid
out the terms of the exclusion precisely supports the conclusion that Congress was aware of who was inc u e< 111 t a
limited group. See H. R. Rep. I~o. 92-231, at 334.
The limited nature of MedicaH.I eligibility did uot pass
unnoticed by the Pnacting Congress. In thP same bill that
established the SST program. C',ongrf'ss considered, and passed,
an amendment to Medicaid, providing coverag<' of inpatient
services to a large number of tlw j u veni1e ueedy in public
meutal institutions. 18 ~ee § 1905 (h) of the Act, 42 U. S. C.
18 To hl' digibl<~ for ~[r(hcmd !'('Ullbur~Pmeut for mpat]('nt services, mentally ill JWI'tion,: under the age of 21 h<~mg tn·afl'd in lllt'Jltal institutions
mu:;t be rere1vi11~ '·active trc•atmmt" that lll('et::; :;taudard~ pn~cribed by
the S(•Cretary and that ''can ren~onnhly hl' exp<•eted to nnvrove the eoudition 'by T<'a.-:o11 of whieh ::;uch H(•rvice:; :He lH'('t':;sary to I he exteut that
eventually :such :service:> will no longer be npee:-._"Hf) " § 1905 (h)(l)(B)
<Of ·llHl Act, 4.:.! V. S. C.: . § 1396d (h) (1) (B)

I

~
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§ 1396<1 (h); S. Rep. No. 92- 1230. pp. 280- 281; H. R. Conf.
Rep. No. 92- 1605, p. 65. Also, a Senate proposal for demonstratiou projects on the feasibility of extending Medicaid to
cover all inpatient services provided in public mental institutions was simultaneously defeated. See S. Rep. No. 92-1230,
p. 281; H. R. Couf. Rep. No. 92- 1605, p. 65. Congress was
in the process of considering the wisdom of these limitations
at the time it chose to incorporate them into the SSI provisions. 'rhe decision to do so did not escape controversy. The
Committee hearings contained testimony advocating extension
of both Medicaid and SSI benefits to all needy residents in
public mental institutions. See Social Security Amendments
of 1971, Hearings on H. R. 1 before the Senat~· Committee
on Finance, 92d Cong., 1st and 2d Sess., 2180, 2408-2410,
2479-2485, 3257, 3319 (1972). This legislative history shows
that Congress was aware, when it added § 1611 (e) to the
Act, of the limitations in the Medicaid program that would
restrict eligibility for the reduced SSI benefits; we decline to
regard such deliberate action as the result of inadvertence
(1980)
or ignorance. See Maine v. Thiboutot,- U. S. (slip op. 6).
Having found the adoption of the Medicaid standards intentional, we deem it logical to infer from Congress' deliberate
action an intent to further the same subsidiary purpose that
lies behind the Medicaid exclusion, which, as no party denies,
was adopted because Congress believed the States to have a
"traditional" responsibility to care for those institutionalized
in public mental institutions.10 The Secretary, emphasizing
10

The Medicaid limitation was based on CongrE>s:s' assumption that the
care of persons in public mental in:stitntiom; was properly a responsibility
of the Stut es. See H. R. Rep. No. 1300, 81st Coug., 1st Se;.~., 42 (1949)
(t:Jnacting federal funding for services to the needy aged, blind, and disSlbled provided in public medical institutions, hut excluding assistance to
those in " public or prlva.te institution,; for mental lllness und tuberculosis,
since the States have gem•rally provided for tn('dieal care of such cases");
S. llep. No. 404, 89th Coug., l:st Ses;., pt. 1, 144-1-!7 (1965) (enactlnent
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the then existing congressional desire to economize in the dis~
bursement of federal funds, argues that the decision to limit
: - --L...~
distribution of the monthly stipend to inmates of pu:;:b:;:.li:;;c-'i;n=stitutions who are receiving Medicaid funds "" rationally
related to the legitimate legislative desire to avoid spending
federal resources on behalf of individuals whose care and
treatment are being fully provided for by state and local
government units" and "rnay be said to implement a congressional policy choice to provide supplemental financial assistance for only those "residents of public institutions who already
receive significant federal support in the form of Medicaid
coverage." Brief for Appellant 27-28. We cannot say that
the belief that the States should continue to have the primary
responsibility for making this small "comfort money" allowance available to those res:ding in state-run institutions is au
irrational basis for withholding from them federal general
welfare funds. 20
Although we understand and are inclined to be sympathetic
with appellees' and their supporting amici's asEertions as to
the beneficial effects of a patienes receiving the reduced stipend, we find this a legislative, and JJot a legal, argument.
Congress rationally may elect to shoulder only part of the
burden of supplying this allowance, and may rationally limit
the grant to Medicaid recipients, for whose care the Federal
of Medicaid providing coverage only to the aged net>dy in mental or
tuberculosi::> institutions; 11oting that " [tJhr reason for this exclusion was
tpat long-ter?J care in such hospital::; had traditionaJiy been accepted as a
responsibility of the States,n id., u.t 144) . This exclusion was upheld in
L~gion v. Richardson, 354 1<'. Supp. 45i'i (Sb:NY), ai'ed s·ub nom. Legion v.
Weinberg er, 414 U.S 1058 (197a), and Kautrowitz v. Weinberger, 388 F.
Supp. 1127 (DC 1974), aff'd, 174 U. S. App , D. C. 182, 530 F . 2d 1034,
cert. denied, 429 U. S. 81() (1976), and appellees di::;avow any intention
to dis}'lute that holding. 'Brief for Appellees 26-27 ; Tr. of Oral Arg. 19.
20 Whether a State choo:;e:; to elect or not to elect to provide an
equivalent monthly :;tipend to institutionalizrd mental patients does Mt
alt~t th~ l"ationallty of Contl'e&~) d ~ciJoh.
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Government already has assumed the major portion of the
.expeuse. 21 1'he limited gratuity represents a partial solution
to a far more general problem,~ 2 and Congress legitimately
may assume that the States would, or should, provide an
equivalent, either in funds or in basic care. See Baur v.
Mathews, 578 F . 2d 228, 233 (CA9 1978). This Court has
granted a "strong presumption of constitutionality" to legislation confening monetary benefits, Mathews v. DeCastro, 429
U. S., at 185, because it believes that Congress should have
discretion in decidillg how to expend necessarily limitetl resources. Awarding this type of benefits inevitably involves
the kind of line-drawing that will leave some comparably
needy person outside the favored circfe. 23 We cannot say
that it was irt·ational of Congress, in view of budgPtary con21 The Secretary has interpreted § 1611 (e) (1) (B) to require that at
least 50% of tht> cost of .services be reimbursed by Medieaid brfore tho
l'eduction of beneqlB oecome' effective. ZO CFR § 416~231 (b) (5) (1980).
22 Congress continues to investigate other more grneral solutions and
to propose alterations in P611 (e). See H . R. Rep. No. 9&-451, pt. 1,
p. 153 (1979); 125 Cong :Rec. H10301, H10306, E5526 (d::tily rds. Nov. 7
and 9, 1979) (remarKs of Rep. Corman, Rep. PepJ'>er, and Hep Bingham)
(proposing amendment to § 1611 (e) to fore;;rtall reduction of benefits until
after eligible individual has been institutionalized in u. Meuicaid in&1itntion
for t.hree mont.h s); Staff of the Senate Committee on FinHJICe, The Supplemental Security Income Program, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 109-115
(Comm. Print 1977) (advocating legislative amendments standardizing tho
monthly stipend to institutionalized person,;).
28 "When a legal ui:;tinction i.s determint>d, as no one doubt.-, that. it may
he, between night and day, childhood . and matnrity, or any othPr extremes, a point has to be fixrd or a line lms to br drawn, or gradually
picked out by succe.,;.,;ive decisions, to mark where the changP titk~ place.
Looked at by itself without, regard t-o the necessity behind it the line or
point SC('ms arbitrary. It might as well or nearly as wrll be a little more
to one side or the other. But when it is seen that a, line or point. there
must he, and t.hat there is no mathematical or logical wny of fixing it
precisl:'ly, Uw <lecision of the legi,;lature mu.st be accepted unless we can
say tha.t it is very wide of auy rea:sonable mark." Loui.sville Gas Co. v.
Co!elflmn, 277 U.S. 32, 41 (19:.?8) (Holme,;, J., dissenting) .
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straints/4 to decide that it is the Medicaid recipients in public
institutions that are the most needy and the most deserving
of the small monthly supplement. See, e. g., Califano v.
Boles, 443 U.S. 28~, ~96 0979); Califano v. Jobst, 434 U. S.
47, 53 (1977); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749, 768-770
(1975); Richard v. Belcher, 404 U. S. 78, 83-84 (1971).
We conclude that Congress did not violate appellees' rights
to equal protection by denying them the supplementary
benefit. The judgment of the District Court is reversed.

It is so

m, ...... :::::u:
24

ord~red,

--

The amount of money, and the number of people potentially involved,
are not inconsiderable. Although the appellees do not agree, the Secretary
estimates that the annual cost of implementing the District Court's order
nationwide would ~pproximate ~30 million. Memorandum in Reply to
Appellees' Motion to Affirm 3. In 1979, a total of almost 2.2 million
people were receiving ssr benefits for disabilities, an increase of over
900,000 from January 19H. See Social Security Bulletin 49· (Table M-24)
(June 1979). Further, of all the disabled adults whp applied for benefits
between January 1974 and July 1975, 1.1% were denied eligibility by
reason of their re::;idence in a public im;titution . SeeS. Rep. No . 95-1312 1
p. 7 (table) (1978) .
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JusTICE PowELL, dissenting.
The Court holds that Congress rationally has denied a
small monthly "comfort allowance" to otherwise eligible people solely because previously it rationally denied them Medicaid benefits. In my view, Congress thoughtlessly has applied
a statutory classification developed to further legitimate goals
of one welfare program to another welfare program serving
entirely different needs. The result is an exclusion of wholly
dependent people from minimal benefits, serving no government interest. This irrational classification violates the
equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.
I
The Supplemental Security Income Program (SSI) is a
comprehensive federal program of minimal cash welfare benefits for the indigent blind, aged and disabled. 42 U. S. C.
§§ 1381-1382. See generally Califano v. Aznavorian, 439
U.S. 170, 171 (1978). Section 1611 (e)(1)(A) of the Act,
42 U. S. C. § 1382 (e) (1) (A), operates to reduce substantially, to $25 per month, the SSI benefits available to otherwise eligible persons who reside in public institutions. The
reason for this reduction of benefits is understandable:
"For these people most subsistence needs are met by the
institution and full benefits are not needed. Some pay-
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ment to these people, though, would be needed to enable
them to purchase small comfort items not supplied by
the institution." H. R. Rep. No. 92-231 , p. 150 (1971).
See also S. Rep. No. 92-1230, p. 386 (1972). This comfort
allowance is provided to institution residents only if the
qualified person resides in a public hospital or institution that
receives Medicaid funds on his behalf. 42 U. S. C. § 1611
(e)(1)(B). Thus, no comfort allowance will be paid to an
individual unless the form of institutionalized treatment he
receives is compensible under the separate Medicaid program.
Appellees are indigent people disabled by mental illness,
and thus otherwise are eligible for SSI payments under 42
U.S. C. §§ 1382c (3)(A) , (C). As residents of public mental institutions between the ages of 21 and 65, however, they
are ineligible to .receive Medicaid benefits for their treatment.
!d., § 1905 (a)(17) (B). For this reason, and none other, appellees may not receive the reduced monthly SSI payments
available to inmates of other medical institutions, including
patients in public medical hospitals and private mental
institutions. 1
The refusal to pay for treatment in public mental institutions has a lengthy history in the development of the federal
medical assistance programs. See Legion v. Richardson, 354
1 Other classes of institut ionalized people denird the reduced SSI allowance include patients in tubercular institutions and prison inmat es. The
Court too quickly dispatches the argument that § 1611 (e) claEsifies on
the basis of mental illness. While it is true that not all menta.!Iy ill people
are denied t he benefit, and that some people denied the benefit are not
mentally ill, it is inescapable that appellees are denied th e benefit because
they are patients in mental institutions. Only the mentally ill are treated
in mental ins titutions. While I would agree that there is no indication
that Congress intended to punish or slight the mentally ill, the history
of Medicaid demonstrat es Congress' special concern with methods of treating mental illness. See, infra, at - . Because I find the classification
irrational, I do not reach the question whether clas,;ifications drawn in
pa~t on the basis of mental health require heightened scrutiny.
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F. Supp. 459 (SDNY), aff'd sub nom. Legion v. Weinberger,
414 U. S. 1058 (1973). Initially, Congress broadly refused
federal aid to individuals diagnosed as mentally ill, Pub. L.
81-734, ch. 809, §§ 303 (a), 343(a), 351, 64 Stat. 549, 554,
557 (1950). Subsequent enactments, however, have extended Medicaid coverage to treatment of mental illness in
public or private medical hospitals or nursing homes, 42
U.S. C. §§ 1396 (a)(1), (4) (1976 and 1978 Supp.), and to
treatment of mental illness of those under 25 and over 65
in a state public mental institution, id., §§ 1396 (d)(a)(14),
(17)(B). Moreover, Congress has defined "public institution" not to include a publicly operated community residence
center serving no more than 16 residents. /d., § 1382 (e)(1)
(C). Thus, federal medical benefits have been extended to
the mentally ill for treatment in various contexts. The residual exclusion of large state institutions for the mentally
ill from federal financial assistance rests on two related principles: States traditionally have assumed the burdens of administering this form of care, and the federal government
has long distrusted the economic and therapeutic efficiency of
large mental institutions. See S. Rep. No. 404, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess., 20 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U. S. Code, Cong. &
Admin. News 1943, 2084. See also 42 U. S. C. § 1396d (h)
(1)(B) (persons under 21 receive Medicaid benefits for treatment in mental institutions only when standards of utility
are met).
The legislative history of § 1611 (e) sheds no light on why
Congress made the exclusion from reduced SSI benefits coextensive with the exclusion from Medicaid payments. 2 The
2 The only indication of Congressional intent states: "No assistance
benefits will be paid to an individual in a penal institution." H. R. Rep.
No. 92-231, 150 (1971). If Congress intended § 1611 (e) to exclude
prison inmates, the classification would be irrationally overinclusive. A
mental hospital is not a penal institution. Neither the Secretary nor the
Court argues that the exclusion of appellees from the comfort allowance
rationally furthers this purpose.
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Secretary argues that Congress might rationally have concluded that the States have the primary responsibility for
making payments of comfort allowances to appellees, because
they already bear the responsibility for paying for their treatment. Brief for Appellant 27. In accepting this justification, the Court adds that whether the States do, ever have, or
ever will provide this benefit to residents of large mental institutions is irrelevant to the rationality of Congress' supposed judgment. Ante, at 16, n. 20.

II
A
Social and economic legislation that does not employ suspect classifications or impinge on fundamental rights must
be upheld under the equal protection component of the Fifth
Amendment when the legislative means are rationally related
to a legitimate government purpose. Railroad Retirement
Board v. Fritz, U. S. (1980). San Antonio School
Board v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S., 1, 17 (1973); Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U. S. 471 (1970). This simply stated test
holds two firmly established principles in tension. The Court
must not substitute its view of wise or fair legislative policy
for that of the duly elected representatives of the people,
Vance v. Bradley, 440 U. S. 109 (1979); Dandridge, supra,
at 486, but the equal protection requirement does place a
substantive limit on legislative power. At a minimum, the
legislature cannot arbitrarily impose burdens on particular
classes of citizens. E. g., Johnson v. Robison, 415 U. S. 361,
374-375 (1974); James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128, 140 (1972);
Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U. S. 164, 175
(1972). Enforcing this prohibition while avoiding unwarranted incursions on the legislative power presents a difficult
task. No bright line divides the merely foolish from the
arbitrary law. 8 Given this difficulty, legislation properly en3

The Court has employed numerous formulations for the "rational
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joys a presumption of rationality, which is particularly strong
for welfare legislation where the apportionment of scarce benefits in accordance with complex criteria requires painful,
but unavoidable line drawing. Mathews v. De Castro, 429
U. S. 181, 185 (1976).
The deference to which legislative accommodation of conflicting interests is entitled rests in part upon the principle
that the political process of our majoritarian democracy re~
sponds to the wishes of the people. Accordingly, an important touchstone for equal protection review of statutes is how
readily a policy can be discerned which the legislature intended to serve. See, e. g., U.S. D. A. v. Moreno, 413 U. S.
528, 536-538 (1973); McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U. S. 263,
270 (1973). When a legitimate purpose for a statute appears
in the legislative history or is implicit in the statutory scheme
itself, a court has some assurance that the legislature has
made a conscious policy choice. Our democratic system requires that legislation intended to serve a discernable purpose
receive the most respectful deference. See Harris v. McRae,
U. S. (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U. S. 464, 479
(1977); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749 (1975). Yet, the
question of whether a statutory classification is arbitrary cannot be divorced from whether it was enacted to Eerve an
actual purpose. When a legislative purpose can be suggested
only by the ingenuity of a government lawyer litigating the
constitutionality of a statute, a reviewing court may be pre~
sented not so much with a legislative policy choice as its
absence. 4
basis" test. Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz,- U. S. - , - , - ,
n. 10 (1980). Members of the Court continue to hold divergent views on
the clarity with which a legislative purpo ·e must appear. See id., at (STEVENS, J., concurring); id., at (BRENNAN, J., dissenting), and
about the degree of deferrence afforded the legislature in &"Uiting means to
ends, compare Lindsley v. National Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 78-79
(1911), with Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
4 Congress' failure to make policy judgments can distort our system of
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In my view, the Court should receive with some skepticism
post hoc hypotheses about legislative purpose, unsupported
by the legislative history. 5 When no indication of legislative
purpose appears other than the current position of the Secretary, the Court should require that the classification bear a
"fair and substantial relation" to the asserted purpose. See
Royster Guano v. Virginia, 253 U. S. 412, 415 (1920). This
marginally more demanding scrutiny indirectly would test
the plausibility of the tendered purpose, and preserve equal
protection review as something more than "a mere tautological recognition of the fact that Congress did what it intended to do." Fritz, supra, at 462 (STEVENS, J., dissenting).

B
Neither the structure of § 1611 nor its legislative history
identifies or even suggests any policy plausibly intended to
be served by denying appellees the small SSI allowance. As
noted above, the only arguable purpose identified in the
House and Senate Reports is the irrelevant goal of depriving
inmates of penal institutions of all benefits. See n. 2, supra.
The structure of the statute offers no guidance as to purpose
separation of powers by encouraging other branches to make essentially
legislative decisions. See Cannon v. University of Virginia, 441 U. S.
677, 743 (1979) (POWELL, J., di~enting).
5 Some of our cases suggest that the actual purpose of a statute is
irrelevant, Fleming v. Nestor, 363 U. S. 603, 612 (1960), and that the
statute must be upheld "if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify" its dis~rimination, McGowan v. Ma1'yiand, 366 U. S.
420, 426 (1961) Altbough these cases preserve an important caution,
they do not d ~ s~ribc the importance of actual legislative purpose in our
analysis. We recognize that a legislative body rarely acts with a single
mind and that compromises blur purpcse. Therefore, it is appropriate
to accord some deference to the executive's view of legislative intent, as
similarly we accord deference to the consistent construction of a statute
by the administrative agency charged with its enforcement. E. g., Udall
v. Tallman, 380 U. S. 1, 16 (1965). Ascertainment of actua.l purpose to
the extent feasible, however, remains our e<:iSential goal.
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because § 1611 (e) is drawn in reference to the policies of
Medicaid rather than to the policies of SSI. By mechanically applying the criteria developed for Medicaid, Congress
appears to have avoided considering 'vhat criteria would be
appropriate for deciding in which public institutions a person can reside and still be eligible for some SSI payment.
The importation of eligibility criteria from one statute to
another creates significant risks that irrational distinctions
will be made between equally needy people. See U.S. D. A.
v. Murray, 413 U. S. 508, 514 (1973); Medora v. Colautti,
602 F. 2d 1149 (CA3 1979).
The Secretary argues, and the Court agrees, that the exclusion "is rationally related to the legitimate legislative
desire to avoid spending federal resources on behalf of individuals whose care and treatment are being fully provided
for by state and local government units." Brief for Appellant 27. The Secretary does not argue that appellees are not
in present need of the comfort allowance; indeed, he concedes
"that the statutory classification does not exclude appellees
because they were thought to be less needy." Brief, at 32. 0
Nor does the Secretary suggests that because a State provides
health care and the necessities of life to inmates of mental
hospitals, the State also will provide the inmate with a comfort allowance. Indeed, no State will be more likely to pay
a patient a comfort allowance because the federal government refused to relieve it of part of the cost of the patient's
medical care. The Court apparently recognizes this, as it
states that whether or not a State actually provides a comfort allowance is irrelevant. Ante, at 16, n. 20. Appellees
simply are denied a benefit provided to other institutionalized, disabled patients.
0 This concession makes it clifficult to accept the Court's conclusion that
Congress rationally could have decided that "Medicaid recipients in public
institutions ... are the most needy and the most deserving of the small
monthly supplement." Ante, at 18.
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But, it is argued, Congress rationally could make the judgment that the States should bear the responsibility for any
comfort allowance, because they already have the respop.sibility for providing treatment and minimal care. There is
no logical link, however, between these two responsibilities.
See U.S. D. A. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973). Residence
in a mental hospital is rationallv related to whether the Conll;ress should pay for the patient's treatment. Legion v.
Richardson. 354 F. Supp. 459 (SDNY). a:ff'd, sub nom. Legion v. Weinberqer, 414 U. S. 1058 (1973). The judgment
whether the federal government should subsidize care for
the mentally ill in large public institutions involves difficult
questions of medical and economic policy. Supra, at - .
But. residence in a public mental institution, as opposed to
residence in a state medical hospital or a private mental hospital, bears no relation to any policy of the SSI program.
The monthly $25 allowance pays for small personal exoenses,
beyond the minimal care and treatment provided by Medicaid or "other programs." H. R. ReD. No. 96- 451 (Pt. 1),
96th Cong., 1st Sess., 153 (1979). If SSI pays a cash benefit relating to personal needs other than maintenance and
mediral care, it is irrelevant whether the State or the Federal Government is paying for the maintenance and medical
care; the patients' need remains the same, the likelihood
that the policies of SSI will be fulfilled remains the same.
I conclude that Congress had no rational reason for refusing to pay a comfort allowance to appellee. while paying it
to numerous otherwise identically situated disabled indigents.
This difference in treatment must have been a legislative
oversight. I therefore dissent.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAT~
No. 79-1380
Richard Schweiker, Secretary of
Health and Human Services, On Appeal from the United
Appellant,
States District Court for
the Northern District of
v.
Illinois.
Charle · Edward Wilson et al.
. [February -, 1981]
JusTICE PowELL, dissenting.
The Court holds that Congress rationally has denied a
small monthly "comfort allowance" to otherwise eligible people solely because previously it rationally denied them Medicaid benefits. In my view, Congress thoughtlessly has applied
a statutory classification developed to further legitimate goals
of one welfare prograin to another welfare program serving
entirely different needs. The result is an exclusion of wholly
dei:>endent people from minimal benefits, serving no government interest. This irrational classification violates the
equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.
I
The Supplemental Security Income Program (SSI) is a
comprehensive federal program of minimal cash welfare benefits for the indigent blind, aged and disabled. 42 U. S. C.
§§ 1381-1382. See generally Califano v. Aznavorian, 439
U. S. 170, 171 (1978) . Section 1611 (e)(1)(A) of the Act,
42 U. S. C. § 1382 (e) (1)(A), operates to reduce substantially, to $25 per month, the SSI benefits available to otherwise eligible persons who reside in public institutions. The
reason for this reduction of benefits is understandable:
"For these people most subsistence needs are met by the
institution and full benefits are not needed. Some pay-
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ment to these people, though, would be needed to enable
them to purchase small comfort items not supplied by
the institution." H . R. Rep. No. 92-231, p. 150 (1971).
~ee

also S. Rep. No. 92-1230, p. 386 (1972). This comfort
allowance is provided to institution residents only if the
qualified person resides in a public hospital or institution that
receives Medicaid funds on his behalf. 42 U. S. C. § 1611
(e)(1)(B) . Thus, no comfort allowance will be paid to an
individual unless the form of institutionalized treatment he
·receives is compensible under the separate Medicaid program.
Appellees are indigent people disabled by mental illness,
·and thus otherwise are eligible for SSI payments under 42
U. S. C. §§ 1382c (3)(A). (C). As residents of public mental institutions between the ages of 21 and 65, however, they
are ineligible to receive Medicaid benefits for their treatment.
Id., § 1905 (a)(17)(B). 1 For this reason, and none other, appellees may not receive the reduced monthly SSI payments
available to inmates of other medical institutions, including
patients in public medical hospitals and private mental
institutions .~

The refusal to pay for treatment in public mental institutions has a lengthy history in the development of the federal
medical assistance programs. See Legion v. Richardson, 354
Other clas:;es of in~titutionalized proplr denird the reduced SSI ullowI.Ilce include patients in tubercular institution<! and prison inmates.
2 The Court too quickly dispatches the argument that. § 1611 (e) clu~Ssi
fies on the basis of mental illne::;s. While it is true that not. all mentally
ill people are denied thr benefit, and that. some people denied the benefit
are not mentally ill, it is ine::;ca,pable that appellees are denied the benefit
because they are patirnts in mental institutions. Only the menta.lly ill
are treated in mrntal in~titutions . While I would agree that there is no
indication that Congress intended to punish or slight the mentally ill, the
history of Medicaid demonstrat{'S Congress' dit>inclination to involve the
federal government in l:itftte t.rcatment. of mental illness in public institutions. See, infra, at. - . Because I find the classification irrational, 1
do not reaeh the question whether classificat.ions drawn in part. on thEt
basis of mental health require heightened scrutiny as appellees ::>uggest.
1
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F. Supp. 459 (SDNY), aff'd sub nom. Legion v. Weinberger,
4.14 U. S. 1058 (1973) . Initially, Congress broadly refused
federal aid to individuals diagnosed as mentally ill, Pub. L.
81-734, ch. 809, §§ 303 (a), 343(a) , 351, 64 Stat. 549, 554,
557 (1950). Subsequent enactments, however, have extended Medicaid coverage to treatment of mental illness in
public or private medical hospitals or nursing homes, 42
U. S. C. §§ 1396 (a)(1), (4) (1976 and 1978 Supp.), and to
treatment of mental illness of those under 25 and over 65
in public mental institutions, id., §§ 1396 (d)(a)(14), (17)
(B) . Moreover, Congress has defined "public institution"
not to include a publicly operated community residence center serving no more than 16 residents. !d., at § 1382 (e)(1)
(C). Thus, federal medical benefits have been extended to
the mentally ill for treatment in various contexts. The residual exclusion of large state institutions for the mentally
ill from federal financial assistance rests on two related principles: States traditionally have assumed the burdens of administering this form of care, and the federal government
has long distrusted the economic and therapeutic efficiency of
large mental institutions. See S. Rep. No. 404, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess., 20 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U. S. Code, Cong. &
Admin. News 1943, 2084. See also 42 U. S. C. § 1396d (h)
(l)(B) (persons under 21 receive Medicaid benefits for treatment in mental institutions only when standards of utility
are met).
The legislative history of § 1611 (e) sheds no light on why
Congress made the exclusion from reduced SSI benefits coextensive with the exclusion from Medicaid payments. 3 The
Secretary argues that Congress might rationally have con..
The only indication of Congressional intent stater,: "No assistance
benefits will be paid to an individtu~l m a pena.l mstitution." H. R. Rep,
No. 92-231, 150 (1971) . A mentill. ho~pitlli is not a penal institution,
Neither the Secretary nor the Court argue::; that the exclu::;ion of appell~
from the comfort allowance rationally furthen, thi::; purpose.
3
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eluded that the States have the primary responsibility for
making payments of comfort allowances to appellees, because
they already bear the responsibility for paying for their treatment. Brief for Appellant 27. In accepting this justification, the Court adds that whether the States do, ever have, or
ever will provide this benefit to residents of large mental institutions is irrelevant to the rationality of Congress' supposed judgment. Ante, at 16, n. 20.

II

A
Social and economic legislation that does not employ suspect classifications or impinge on fundamental rights must
be upheld under the equal protection component of the Fifth
Amendment when the legislative means are rationally related
to a legitimate government purpose. Railroad Retirement
Board v. Fritz,· -U.S.- (1980). See San Antonio School
Board v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S., 1, 17 (1973); Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U. S. 471 (1970). This simply stated test
holds two firmly established principles in tension. The Court
must not substitute its view of wise or fair legislative policy
for that of the duly elected representatives of the people,
Vance v. Bradley, 440 U~ S. 109 (1979); Dandridge, supra,
at 486, but the equal protection requirement does place a
substantive limit on legislative pDwer. At a minimum, the
legislature cannot arbitrarily impose burdens on particular
classes of citizens. E. g., Johnson v. Robison, 415 U. S. 361,
374-375 (1974); James v. Strange, 4071J. S. 128, 140 (1972);
Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U. S. 164, 175
(1972) . Enforcing this prohibition while avoiding unwarranted incursions on the legislative power presents a difficult
task. No bright hne divides the merely foolish from the
arbitrary law.4 Given this difficulty, legislation properly en~The Court ha:; employed numerous formulations for the "rationaf
basis" tf'"t .. Railroad Retirement Board v. Pritz,- U.S.-,-,-.,.
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joys a presumption of rationality, which is particularly strong
for welfare legislation where the apportionment of scarce benefits in accordance with complex criteria requires painful,
but Ullavoidable line drawing. Mathews v. De Castro, 429
u. s. 181, 185 (1976) .
The deference to which legislative accommodation of conflicting interests is entitled rests in part upon the principle
that the political process of our majoritarian democracy responds to the wishes of the people. Accordingly, an important touchstone for equal protection review of statutes is how
readily a policy can be discerned which the legislature intended to serve. See, e. g., U. S. D. A. v. Moreno, 413 U. S.
528, 536-538 (1973); McGinn·is v. Royster, 410 U. S. 263,
270 (1973) . When a legitimate purpose for a statute appears
in the legislative history or is implicit in the statutory scheme
itself, a court has some assurance that the legislature has
made a conscious policy choice. Our democratic system requires that legislation intended to serve a discernable purpose
receive the most respectful deference. See Harris v. McRae,
U. S. (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U. S. 464, 479
(1977); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749 (1975). Yet, the
question of whether a statutory classification discriminates
arbitrarily cannot be divorced from whether it was enacted
to serve an identifiable purpose. When a legislative purpose
can be suggested only by the ingenuity of a government lawyer litigating the constitutionality of a statute, a reviewing
court may be presented not so much with a legislative policy
choice as its absence. 5
n. 10 (1980) . MernbertJ of the Court continue to hold divergent views on
the clarity with which a legislative purpose must appear. See id., at (S•rEVENI:l, J ., concurring); id ., at (BREN NAN, J., ditJSenting), and
about the degree of deferrence afforded the legislature in :>'Uiting means to
E"ndtJ, compare Lindsley v. National Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 78-79
(1911), with Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
5 Congres::;' fa!lure to make policy judgments can distort our system or
separation of powers by encouraging other branches to make essentially
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In my view, the Court should receive with some skepticism
post hoc hypotheses about legislative purpose, unsupported
by the legislative history.fl When no indication of legislative
purpose appears other than the current position of the Secretary, the Court should require that the classification bear a
"fair and substantial relation" to the asserted purpose. See
Royster Guano v. Virginia, 253 U. S. 412, 415 (1920). This
marginally more demanding sm:utiny indirectly would test
the plausibility of the tendered purpose, and preserve equal
protection review as something more than "a mere tautological recognition of the fact that Congress did what it in~
tended to do,'' Fritz, supra, at 462 (STEVENS, J., dissenting) .

B
Neither the structure of § 1611 nor its legislative history
identifies or even suggests a.n y policy plausibly intended to
be served by denying appellees the small SSI allowance. As
noted above, the only purpose identified iu the House aiid
Senate Reports is the irrelevant goal of depriving inmates
of penal im:titutious of all benefits. See n. 2, supra. The
structure of the statute offers no guidance as to purpose belegislativt> decision~> . See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677,
743 (197!:) (POWELL, J., (h:;sentirg).
"Some of our case;, ~uggest that the actual purpose of a ::;tatute i:;
irrelevant, Fleming v Nestor, ;363 l' S. 603, 612 (1960), and that the·
,;;tatute mu:;t be upheld "if any :;tate of fact:; rPa::;onably may be conceived to JUstify" it:; discrimination, McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S.
420, 426 (1961) Although the:;e case::; pre:;erve an important caution,
tbey do not d:s~nbc the importance of actual legislative purpo:;e in our
analy:;is. We recognize that a legi:;lative body rarely act::; with a single
mind and that compromises blur purpose. Therefore, it IS appropriate·
to accord ::;orne dcfcrenC'e to the executive'::; view of legi::;lative intent, as
~ imilarl y wp accord deference to the con~istent con~>iruction of a :;tatute
hy the admim:;trative agenc) charged with it~ enforcement. E . (J., Udall'
v. Tallman, 380 U . S 1, 16 (1965). A:;certainment of actual purpose to
the extent feusible, however, remaius an e::;sential ~tep in equal protection_
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cause ~ lti 11 (e) is drawn in reference to the policies of
Medicaid rather than to the policies of SSI. By mechanically applying the criteria developed for Medicaid, Congress
appears to have avoided considering what criteria would be
appropriate for deciding in which public institutions a person can reside and still be eligible for some SSI payment.
The importation of eligibility criteria from one statute to
another creates significant risks that irratiOnal distinctions
will be made between equally needy people. See U.S. D. A.
V, Murray, 413 U. S. 508, 514 (1973); Medora v. Colautti,
602 F. 2d 1149 (CA3 1979) .
The Secretary argues, and the Court agrees, that the exclusion "1s rationally related to the legitimate legislative
desire to avoid spending federal resources ou behalf of individuals whoEe care and treatment are being fully provided
for by state aud local government units." Brief for Appellant 27. The Secretary does not argue that appellees are not
in present need of the comfort allowance; indeed, he concedes
"that the statutory classification does not exclude appellees
becal'se they were thought to be less needy." !d., at 32. 7
Nor does the Secretary suggests that because a State provides
health care and the necessities of life to inmates of mental
hospitals, the State also will provide the inmate with a comfort allowance. Indeed, the probability that a State will pay
a patient a comfort allowance does not increase when the
federal government refuses to relieve it of part of the cost of
the patient's medical care. The Court apparently recognizes
this, as it states that whether or not a State actually provides
a comfort allowance is irrelevant. Ante, at 16, n. 20. Appellees simply are denied a benefit provided to other institutionalized, disabled patients.
ThiH conce;;sion make~ it difficult to accept the Court's conclusion tha.t
rationally could havE' decided that ·'Medicaid recipients in public
institution:> . . . are the most needy and the most deserving of the small
monthly :supplemeiJt ." Ante, at 18.
7
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But, it is argued, Congress rationally could ma.ke the judg~
ment that the States should bear the responsibility for any
comfort allowance, because they already have the responsibility for providing treatment and m~nimal care. There is
no logical link, however, between these two responsibilities.
See U.S. D. A, v. Moreno, 413 U. S. 528 (1973). Residence
in a public mental hospital is rationally rela.ted to whether
the Congress should pay for the patient's treatment. Legion
v. Richardson, 354 F. Supp. 459 (SDNY), aff'd. sub nom. Legion v. Weinberger, 414 U. S. 1058 (1973). The judgment
whether the federal government should subsidize care for
the mentally ill in large public institutions involves difficult
questions of medical and economic policy. Supra, at - .
But. residence in a public mental institution, as opposed to
residence in a state medical hospital or a private mental hospital, bears no relation to any policy of the SSI program.
The monthly $25 allowance pays for small personal expenses,
beyond the minimal care and treatment provided by Medicaid or "other programs." H. R. Rep. No. 96-451 (Pt. 1),
96th Cong., 1st Sess., 153 (1979). If SSI pays a cash benefit relating to personal needs other than maintenance and
medi<·al care, it is irrelevant whether the State or the Federal Government is paying for the maintenance and medical
care; the patients' need remains the same, the likelihood
that the policies of SSI will be fulfilled remains the same.
I conclude that Co11gress had no rational reason for refusing to pay a comfort allowance to appellee, while paying it
to numerous otherwise identically situated disabled indigents.
This unexplained difference in treatment must have been ~
legislative oversight. I therefore dissent.

79-1380 Harris

Dear Harry:
You have written a fine opinion for the Court. I
will, however, in accord with my vote at Conference, try my
hand at a dissent.
As I hope to get away for a nearly a week, it will
be well into February before I can get to this.
K

Sincerely,

Mr. Justice
lfp/ss
cc:

The

,,

To: Mr. Justice Powell
From: Peter
Re: Schweiker v. Wilson, No. 79-1380
2/14/81

Please note that Part II, A of this draft probably
could be reduced to one paragraph if necessary. I undertook to
analyze the problem of ascertaining legislative purpose because
of reading Murgia, because this case seemed to present that
problem, and because you have never stated your rejection of
McGowan v. Maryland in any published opinion. Although you lost
in Murgia, the issue lives on, as you know from the separate
opinions in Railroad Retirement. I would be pleased to explore
the problem further, or merely drop it and rewrite the draft to
say that the statute flunks the rational basis test.

'

.

lfp/ss

2/16/81
MEMORANDUM

TO:

Peter

DATE:

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

Feb. 16, 1981

Schweicker
Your first draft, dated 2/10/81, is persuasive.

I

think your Part II is as good any anything I have seen on
equal protection analysis, and - as I have softened it a bit
- I will certainly keep it for a Chambers Draft to see
whether your colleagues challenge it.
I have dictated some language to be added to
footnote 5.

This may require some further editing.

Without checking back, my recollection is that we
use the word "purpose" rather consistently.
term used in equal protection analysis.

This is the

I assume it is

synonymous with "intent" that is used normally in discussing
interpretation of statutory language.

Unless there is some

distinction not apparent to me, I would like to use the
words interchangeably.
•

In Part III you identify the inequality that is

the subject of this case.

Without checking back, it seems

to me that this could be made clearer in Part I, so that the
reader would have the inequity in mind as we move into Part
II that addresses the appropriate equal protection analysis.
For example, when I first looked at this case I wondered how

2.

a distinction could be made between patients in a public
mental institution, and patients in a public medical
hospital, or a private mental institution.

I would state

this consequence of the statute "loudly and clearly" at an
appropriate place in Part I.

* * *
I

would like to move this opinion to a circulation

as promptly as possible.

Let's talk about program.

L.F.P., Jr.
ss
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

February 20, 1981

Re:

79-1380 - Schweiker v. Wilson

Dear Lewis:
Please join me in your dissenting opinion.
Respectfully,

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS OF"

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

February 20, 1981

Re: No. 79-1380, Schweiker v. Wilson

Dear Harry:
I join.

Regards,

Justice Blackmun
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN, JR

RE:

/

No.79-1380 Harris v. Wilson

Dear Lewis:
After studying your dissent once more, I am content.
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell
cc: The Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

Re:

No. 79-1380 - Schweiker v. Wil

Dear Lewis:
Please join me in

'"f!'A .
T.M.

Justice Powell
cc:

The Conference
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2nd DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAT}ll
No. 79-1380
Richard Schweiker, Secretary of
l!ealth and Human Services, On Appeal from the United
States District Court for
Appellant,
· the Northern District Of
v.
Illinois.
~harles Edward Wilson et al.

JusTICE PoWELL, dissenting.
The Court holds that Congress rationally has denied ·a
amall monthly "comfort allowance" to otherwise eligible peo·ple solely because previously it rationally denied them Medicaid benefits. ln my view, Congress thoughtlessly has applied
a statutory classification developed to further legitimate goals
of one welfar~ program to another welfare program serving
entirely differeht needs. The result is an exclusion of wholly
~dependent pedple from minimal benefits, serving no governmeJ:J.t interest. This irrational classification violates the
iqual protection component of the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.

I
The Supplemental Security Income program (SSI) is a
comprehensive federal program of minimal cash welfare benefits for the indigent blind, aged and disabled. 86 Stat. 1465,
42 U. S. C. § 1381 et seq. See generally Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170, 171 (1978). Section 1611 (e)(1)(A)
Qf the Act, 42 U.S. C. § 1382 (e)(1)(A). operates to reduce
aubstantially, to $25 per month. the SSI benefits available to
6therwise eligible persons who reside in public institutions.
The reason for this reduction of benefit is understandable:
"For these people most subsistence needs are met by the
institution and full benefits are not needed. Some pay-
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ment to these people, though, would be needed to enable
them to purchase small comfort items not supplied by
the institution." H. R. Rep. No. 92-231, p. 150 (1971).
See also S. Rep. No. 92-1230, p. 386 (1972). This comfort
allowance is providf'Jd to institution residents only if the
qualified person resiqes in a public hospital or institution that
receives Medicaid funds on his behalf. 42 U. S. C. § 1611
(e)(l)(B). '.fhus, no comfort allowance will be paid to an
individual unless the form of institutionalized treatment he
receives is compensible under the separate Medicaid program.
Appellees are indigent people disabled by mental illness,
and thus otherwise are eligible for SSI payments under 42
U. S. C. §§ 1382c (a) (3) (A), (C). As residents of public
mental institutions between the ages of 21 and 65, however,
they are ineligible to receive Medicaid benefits for their treatment. !d., § 1396a (a)(17)(B). 1 For this reason, and none
other, appellees may not receive the reduced monthly SSI
payments available to inmates of other medical institutions,
including patients in public medical hospitals and private
mental institutions. 2
The refusal to pay for treatment in public mental institutions has a lengthy history in the development of the federal
medical assistance programs. See Legion v. Richardson, 354
1 Other classes of institutionalized people denied the reduced SSI allowance include patients in tubercular institutions and prison imnates.
1 1.'he Court too quickly dispa.tches the argument that § 1611 (e) cla:ssifies on the basis of mental illness. While it is true that not all mentally
ill people are denied the benefit, a,nd that some people denied the benefit
are not mentally ill, it is inescapable that appellees are denied the benefit
because they are pa,tients in mentaJ inst.itutions. Only the mentally ill
are treated in mental institutions. While I would agree that there is no·
indication that Congress intended to pt111ish or slight, the mentally ill, the
history of Medicaid demonstrates Congress' disinclination to involve the
federal government in state trea,tment of mental illnes::; in public institutions. See, infra, at - . Because I find the classifica.t.ion irrational, I
do not. reach the question whether classifications drawn in part on the·
basis of mental health require 11eighte11ed scrutiuy as avpellees s\1gge!lt,.
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~. Supp. 456 (SDNY), aff'd sub nom. Legion v. Weinoerver,

·H4 U. S. 1058 (1973). Initially, Congress broadly refused
federal aid to individuals diagnosed as mentally ill, Pub. L.
81-734, ch. 809, §§ 303 (a), 343(a), 351, 64 Stat. 549, 554,
1>57-558 (1950). Subsequent enactments, however, have extended Medicaid coverage to treatment of mental illness in
public or private medical hospitals or nursing homes, 42
U. S. C. §§ 1396 (a)(1), ( 4) (1976 and 1978 Supp.), aud
to treatment of mental illness of those under 25 and over
tiS in public mental institutions, id., §§ 1396d (a) (14), (16 ).
Moreover, Congress has defined "public institution" not to
include a publicly operated community residence center serving no more than 16 residents. ld., at § 1382 (e)(1)(C).
Thus, federal medical benefits have been extended to the
mentally ill for treatment in various contexts. The residual exclusion of large state institutions for the mentally ill
from federal financial assistance rests ou two related principles: States traditionally have assumed the burdens of administering this form of care, and the federal government
has long distrusted the economic and therapeutic efficiency of
large mental institutions. See S. Rep. No. 404, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess., 20 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U. S. Code, Cong. &
Admin. News 1943, 2084. See also 42 U. S. C. § 1396d (h)
(l)(B) (persons under 21 receive Medicaid benefits for treatment in mental institutions only when standards of utility
are met).
The legislative history of § 1611 (e) sheds no light on why
Congress made the exclusion from reduced SSI benefits coextensive with the exclusion from Medicaid payments. 3 The
Secretary argues that Congress might rationally have conThe only indication of Congressional intent states: "No assistance
benefits will be paid to an individual in t~ penal in~titution." H. R. Rep.
No. 92-231, 150 (1971). A mental hospital is not a penal institution.
Neither the Secretary nor the Court argues that the exclusion of appellees
from the comfort allowance rationally furthers this purpose.
1
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eluded tl,}a.~' the States have the primary responsibility for
making payments of comfort allowances to appellees, because
they already bear the responsibili.t y for paying for their treatment. Brief for Appellant 27. In accepting this justification, the Court adds that whether the States'do, ever have, or
ever will provide this benefit to residents of large mental institutions is irrelevant to the ' rationality of Congress' supposed judgment. Ante, at i6, n. 20.

II
'A
Social and economic legislation that does not employ suspect classifications or impinge on fundamental rights must
be upheld under the equal protection component of the Fifth
Amendment when the legislative means are rationally related
to a legitimate government purpoEe. U. S. Railroad Retirement Hoard v. Fritz,- U.S.- (1980). See San Antonio
School Board v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 17 (1973); Dandridge
v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 (1970). This simply stat::d test
holds two firmly established principles in tension . · The Court
must not substitute its view of wise or fair legislative policy
for that of the duly elected representatives of the people,
Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 109 (1979); Dandridge, supra,
at 485-486, but the equal protection requirement
does place
.
a substantive limit on legislative power. At a minimum, the
legislature cannot arbitrarily impose burdens on particular
classes of citizens. E . g., Johnson v. Rob-ison, 415 U. S. 361 ,
374-375 (1974); James v. Strange, 407 U. S. 128, 140 (1972);
Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co ., 406 U. S. 164, 175
(1972). Enforcing this prohibition while avoiding unwarranted incursions on the legislative power presents a difficult
task. No. bright line divides the merely foolish from the
arbitrary law. 4 · Given this difficulty, legislation properly en-

.

• The Court has employed numerous formulations for the " rational
U, S. - , - ,
basis" telit. U. S. Railroad R etirement Bd. v. Fritz, -
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joys a presumption of rationality, which is particularly strong
for welfare legislation where the apportionment of scarce benefits in accordance with complex criteria requires painful,
but unavoidable line drawing. Mathews v. De Castro, 429
u. s. 181, 185 (1976).
The deference to which legislative accommodation of conflicting interests is entitled rests in part upon the principle
that the political process of our majoritarian democracy responds to the wishes of the people. Accordingly, an important touchstone for equal protection review of statutes is how
readily a policy can be discerned which the legislature intended to serve. See, e. g., U. S. D. A. v. Moreno, 413 U. S.
p28, 536-538 ( 1973) ; McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U. S. 263,
270 (1973). When a legitimate purpose for a statute appears
in the legislative history or is implicit in the statutory scheme
itself, a court has some assurance that the legislature has
made a conscious policy choice. Our democratic system requires that legislation intended to serve a discernable purpose
receive the most respectful deference. See Harris v. McRae,
- · U. S. (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U. S. 464, 479
(1977); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975). Yet,' the
question of whether a statutory classification discriminates
arbitrarily cannot be divorced from whether it was enacted
to serve an identifiable purpose. When a legislative purpose
can be suggested only by the ingenuity of a government lawyer litigating the constitutionality of a sta.tute, a reviewing
court may be presented not so much with a legislative policy
choice as its absence.&
- , n. 10 ( 1980). Members of the Court l'Ontinue to hold divergent
views on the clarity with which a legislative purpose must appear, see id.,
at (&rEVEM!, J ., concurring); id., at (BRENNAN, J., dissenting),
anJ about the degree of deferrence afforded the .legislature in suiting
mea11s to end!:!, compare Lindsle'Y v. Nativnal Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S.
11, 78-79 (1911 ), with Rayster Guano Co . v. Virginia, 253 U . S. 412, 415
(1920).
3 Congress' failure w make policy judgments can distort our system of
separation of powers by encouraging other branches to muke essentially

t9-:1~80-DISSEN~
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In my vi~w, ~he Pourf sht~ulfl peceiye wifh some skepticism
post hoc hypo~heses abou~ ll;lgi~lp.t1ve purpose, unsupported
by the legislative history.6 When no inqication of legislative
purpose appears other than the current position of the Secretary, the Court should require that the classification bear a
"fair and substantial relation" to the asserted purpose. See
Royster Guano v. Virginia, 253 U. S. 412, 415 (1920). This
marginally more demanding scrutiny indirectly would test
the plausibility of the tendered purpose, and preserve equal
protection review as something more than "a mere tautological recognition of the fact that Congress did what it intended to do." Fritz, supra, a t - (STEVENS, J., concurring).

:B
Neither the structure of § 1611 nor its legislative history
identifies or even suggests any policy plausibly intended to
be served by denying appellees th~ small SSI allowance. As
noted above, th~ only purpose identified in the House and
Senate Reports is the ir'relevant goal of depriving inmates
of penal institutions of all benefits. See n. 2, supra. The
structure of the statute offers no guidance as to purpose belegislative decisions . See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677,
743 (1979 (PowELL, J., dissenting).
0 Some of our cases suggest that the actual purpose of a statute is
irrelevant, Flemming v. Nestor , :363 U. S. 603, 612 (1960), and t,Jmt the
statute must be upheld "if any state o~- factl:l reasonably may be conMaryland, 366 U . S.
ceived to justify" iti:i dil:lcrimination, McGowa¥t
420, 426 (1961) .. Ahhough these ea;es preserve in i·rnporta.n t caution,
they do not d ~ s2ribc the importance of actual legislative purpose in our
analysis. We recognize that .a legil:llative body rarely acts with a single
mind and that compromises blur purpose. Therefore, it is appropriate
to accord some d~ference to the executive'l:l view of legislative intent, as
&imilarly we accor.d deference to the con~istent construction of a ~tatute
by the administrative agency charged with it::; enforcement . E . g., Udall
v . Tallman, 380 U . S. 1, 16 (1965) . A:scertainment of actual purpose to
'the e.,tent feasible , however, remains an essential step in eCjllal1h'6tecbon.

v.
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cause § 1611 (e) is drawn in reference to the policies of
Medicaid rather than to the policies of SSI. By mechanically applying the criteria developed for Medicaid, Congress
appears to have avoided considering ''vhat criteria would be
appropriate for deciding in which public institutions a person can reside and still be eligible for some SSI payment.
The importation of eligibility criteria from one statute to
another creates significant risks that irrational distinctions
will be made between equally needy people. See U.S. D. A.
v. Murry , 413 U. S. 508, 514 (1973); Medora v. Colautti,
602 F. 2d 1149 (CA3 1979).
The Secretary argues, and the Court agrees, that the exclusion "is rationally related to the legitimate legislative
desire to avoid spending federal resources on behalf of individuals whose care and treatment are bein~ fully provided
for by state and local government units." Brief for Appellant 27. The Secretary does not argue that appellees are not
in present need of the comfort allowance; indeed, he concedes
"that the statutory classification does not exclude appellees
becavse they were thought to be less needy." /d ., at 32. 7
Nor does the Secretary suggests that because a State provides
health care and the necessities of life to inmates of mental
hospitals, the State also will provide the inmate with a comfort allowance. Indeed, the probability that a State will pay
a patient a comfort allowance does not increase when the
federal government refuses to relieve it of part of the cost of
the patient's medical care. The Court apparently recognizes
this, as it states that whether or not a State actually provides
a comfort allowance is irrelevant. Ante, at 16, n. 20. Appellees simply are denied a benefit provided to other institutionalized, disabled patients.
'This con ce~ion Illl:tke:; it difficult. to accept the Court's conclusion that.
Congress rationally could huve decided that "Medicaid recipients in public
institutions .. . are the most ueedy and the most deserving of the l:lllfalf
monthly supplement." Ante, at 18'..
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But, it is argued, Congress rationally could make the judgment that the States should bear the responsibility for any
comfort allowance, because they already have the responsibility for providing treatment and minimal care. There is
no logical link, however, between these two responsibilities.
See U. S . D . A. v. Murry, 413 U. S. 508 (1973). Residence
in a public mental hospital is rationally rela.ted to whether
the Congress should pay for the patient's treatment. Legion
v. Richardson, 354 F. Supp. 456 (SDNY), aff'd, sub nom. Legion v. Weinberger, 414 U. S. 1058 (1973). The judgment
whether the federal government should subsidize care for
the mentally ill in large public institutions involves difficult
questions of medical and economic policy. Supra, at - .
But, residence in a public mental institution, as opposed to
residence in a state medical hospital or a private mental hospital, bears no relation to any policy of the SSI program.
The monthly $25 allowance pays for small personal expenses,
beyond the minimal care and trea.tment provided by Medicaid or "other programs." H. R. Rep. No. 96-451 (Pt. 1),
96th Cong., 1st Sess., 153 (1979). If SSI pays a cash benefit relating to personal needs other than maintenance and
medical care, it is irrelevant whether the State or the Federal Government is paying for the maintenance and medical
care; the patients' need remains the same, the likelihood
that the policies of SSI will be fulfilled remains the same.
I conclude that Congress had no rational reason for refusing to pay a comfort allowance to appellee, while paying it
to numerous otherwise identically situated disabled indigents.
This unexplained difference in treatment must have been a
legislative oversight. : I therefore dissent.

t Justioe
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JusTICE PowELL, dissenting.
The Court holds that Congress rationally has denied a
small monthly "comfort allowance" to otherwise eligible people solely because previously it rationally denied them Medicaid benefits. In my view, Congress thoughtlessly has applieq
a statutory classification developed to further legitimate goals
of one welfare prograin to another welfare program serving
entirely different needs. The result is an exclusion of wholly
dependent people from minimal benefits, serving no government interest. This irrational classification violates the
equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.
I
The Supplemental Security Income .P'rogram (SSI) is a
comprehensive federal program of mini.fual cash welfare benefits for the indigent blind, aged and disabled. A2 U. S. C.
§ 1381~. See generally Califano v. Azn(tvorian, 439
. S. 176, ' 171 (1978). Section 1611 (e)(1)(A) of the Act,
42 U. S. C. § 1382 (e)(1)(A), operates to reduce substantially, to $25 per month, the SSI benefits available to otherwise eligible persons who reside in public .institutions. The
~a~on for this reduction of benefits is understandable:
"For these people most subsistence needs are met by the
institution and full benefits are not needed. Some pay-

1e

taat
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ment to these people, though, would be needed to enable
them to purchase small comfort items not supplied by
the institution." H. R. Rep. No. 92-231, p. 150 (1971).

(a)

Bee also S. Rep. No. 92-1230, p. 386 (1972). This comfort
allowance is provided to institution residents only if the
qualified person resides in a public hospital or institution that
receives Medicaid funds on his behalf. 42 U. S. C. § 1611
(e)(1)(B). Thus, no comfort allowance will be paiu to an
individual unless the form of institutionalized treatment he
receives is compensible unuer the separate Medicaid program.
Appellees are inuigent people disabled by mental illness,
·and thus otherwise are eligible for SSI payments under 42
U. S. C. §§ 1382CJ3)(A). (C). As residents of public mental institutions between the ages of 21 and 65, however, they
are ineligible to receive Medicaid benefits for their treatment.
!d., §
a)(17) (B). 1 For this reason, and none other, appellees may not receive the reduceu mouthly SSI payments
available to inmates of other medical institutions, including
patients in public meuical hospitals and private mental
1.... in~itutions. 2

The refusal to pay for treatment in public mental institutions has a lengthy history in the development of the federal
medical assistance programs. See Legion v. Richardson, 354
Otlwr ela.~S('S of in~titutionalizrd people urnied the n'tlucru SSI allowt\nce includr patient~S in tubercular institution::; and prison inmates.
2 The Court too quickly dispatches the argument that. § 1611 (e) classifies on the basi,; of ment.al illne,;s. While it is true that not all mentally
ill people are dE-nied tlw benefit. and that some peoplr clrnird thr benefit
are not. mentally ill, it is ine::;c•apable that appE-llees are denieu the bE-nefit
because they a re patirnts in mental in:;titutions. Only thE' mentally ill
are treated in mrnta l in~tit.ution s. Whil<' I would agrE-e that therr is no
indication that Congress intended to Jllmi::;h or slight the mentally ill, the
history of Medicaid dPmon:;tra tes Congre::;:-;' disinclination to involve the
feclernl government in ~tatr t.rPatment of m~>ntal illness in public in::;titut.ions. See, infra, at - . Berausc I find the classification irrational, I
do not reach thr question whether elassifications drawn in part on thEt
basis of mental health require heightened :;crutiny as appellee:; l:illgge::;t,
1
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SDNY), aff'd sub norn. Legion v. Weinberger,
414 U. S.
8 (1973). Initially, Congress broadly refused
federal aid to individuals diagnosed as mentally ill, Pub. L.
81-734, ch. 809, §§ 303 (a), 343(a), 351, 64 Stat. 549, 554,
55~ (1950). Subsequent enactments, however, have extended Medicaid coverage to treatment of mental ill11ess in
public or private medical hospitals or nursing homes, 42
U.S. C. §§ 1396 (a)(1), (4) (1976 and 1978 Supp.), and to
treatment of mental illuess of those under 25 and over 65
in public mental institutions, id., §§ 1396 {d1(a) (14). {:::1l:r
{4P. Moreover, Congress has defined "lJUblic institution"
ifo't to include a publicly operated community residence center serving no more than 16 residents. /d., at§ 1382 (e)(1)
(C). Thus, federal medical benefits have been extended to
the mentally ill for treatment in various contexts. The residual exclusion of large state institutions for the mentally
ill from federal financial assistance rests on two related principles: States traditionally have assumed the burdens of administering this form of care, and the federal government
has long distrusted the economic and therapeutic efficiency of
large mental institutions. See S. Rep. No. 404, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess., 20 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U. S. Code, Cong. &
Admin. News 1943, 2084. See also 42 U. S. C. § 1396d (h)
(1)(B) (persons under 21 receive Medicaid benefits for treatment in mental institutions only when standards of utility
are met).
The legislative history of § 1611 (e) sheds no light on why
Congress made the exclusion from reduced SSI benefits coextensive with the exclusion from Medicaid payments. 3 The
Secretary argues that Congress might rationally have con ...

1

The only indication of Congressional intPnt states: "No a.·sh;tance
benefits will be paid to an individual in a penal in~titution." H. R Hep,
No. 92-231, 150 (1971). A mental ho~pital is not tt penal institution.
Neither the Secretary nor the Court argues that the exclui:iion of a,ppellee::;from the comfort allowance rationally further::; this purpo:;e.
3
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eluded that the States have the primary responsibility for
making payments of comfort allowances to appellees. because
they already bear the responsibility for paying for their treatment. Brief for Appellant 27. In accepting this justification, the Court adds that whether the States do, ever have, or
ever will provide this benefit to residents of large rnental institutions is irrelevant to the rationality of Congress' supposed judgment. Ante, at 16, n. 20.

II

A
Social aud economic legislation that does not employ suspect classifications or impinge 011 fundamental rights must
be upheld under the equal protection component of the Fifth
Amendment when the legislative means are.....rationally related
a legitimat.e government purpose. /f!ailroad Retirement
oard v. Fritz,- U.S.- (1980). See San Antonio School
oard v. Rodriyuez, 411 U. S., 1, 17 (1973); Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U. S. 471 (1970). This simply stated test
holds two firmly established principles in t€nsion. The Court
must uot substitute its view of wise or fair legislative policy
for that of the duly elected representatives of the people,
ce v. ra ey, 440 U. S. ft 09 (1979); Dandridge, supra,
at ~6, but the equal prote'clion requirement does place a
substantive limit on legislative power. At a minimum, the
legislature cannot arbitrarily impose burdens on particular
classes of citizens. E. g., Johnson v. Robison, 415 U. S. 361,
374- 375 (1974); Ja'rnes v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128, 140 (1972);
Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U. S. 164, 175
( 1972). Enforcing this prohibitiou while avoiding unwarranted incursious on the legislative power presents a difficult
task. No bright line divides the merely foolish from the
arbitrary law. 4 Given this difficulty, legislation properly en-

U
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joys a presumption of rationality, which is particularly strong
for welfare legislation where the apportionment of scarce benefits in accordance with complex criteria requires painful,
but unavoidable line drawing. Mathews v. De Castro, 42H
U. S. 181. 185 (1976).
The deference to which legislative accommodation of conflicting interests is entitled rests in part upon the principle
that the political process of our majoritarian democracy responds to the wishes of the people. Accordingly, an important touchstone for equal protection review of statutes is how
readily a policy can be discemed which the legislature intended to serve. See, e. g., U. S. D. A. v. Moreno, 413 U. S.
528, 536-538 ( 1973); M cGinn·is v. Royster, 410 U. S. 263,
270 (1973). When a legitimate purpose for a statute appears
in the legislative history or is implicit in the statutory scheme
itself, a court has some assurance that the legislature has
made a conscious policy choice. Our democratic system requires that legislation intended to serve a discernable purpose
receive the most respectful deference. See Harris v. McRae,
U. S. (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U. S. 464, 479
(1977); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749 (1975). Yet, the
question of whether a statutory classification discriminates
arbitrarily cannot be divorced from whether it was enacted
to serve an identifiable purpose. When a legislative purpose
can be suggested only by the ingenuity of a government lawyer litigating the constitutionality of a statute, a reviewing
court may be presented not so much with a legislative policy
choice as its absence. 5
n. 10 (1980). Membrr;:; of the Court continue to hold diverg_!"e:!.!n.!:..t~.loi'IS-.mr-,
clarity with which a. lrgislative purpo;:;e must ll.ppearDee id., at (S'l'EYENH, J., concurring); id ., at (BHENNAN, J., di::;::;pnting), tUld
about the drgrPP of clrferrence affordPd the lrgi:,;lature in :mitiug nw~tns to
end:;, compare Lindsley v. National Carbonic Gas Cu., 220 U. S. 61, 7S-79
( 1911) , with Royster Guauo Co . v. Virginia, 25:1 U. S. 412, 415 (1920).
5 Congress' fa1lure to make policy judgments can distort our system of
separation of power::; by encouraging other branchc::; to make essentially

1 the
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In my view, the Court should receive with some skepticism
post hoc hypotheses about legislative purpose, unsupported
by the legislative history. 6 When IJO indication of legislative
purpose appears other than the current position of the Secretary, the Court should require that the classification bear a
"fair and substantial relation " to the asserted purpose. See
Royster Guano v. Virginia, 253 U. S. 412, 415 (1920). This
marginally more demanding scrutiny indirectly would test
the plausibility of the tendered purpose, and preserve equal
protection review as something more than "a mere tautological recognition of the fact that Congress did what it intended to do." Fritz, supra, at!! (STEVENS, J., .Qi~tting).

B
Neither the structure of § 1611 nor its legislative history
identifies or even suggests any policy plausibly intended to
be served by denying appellees the small SSI allowance. As
noted above, the only purpose identified in the House and
SenatE:' Reports is the irrelevant goal of depriving inmates
of penal im:titutions of all benefits. ~ee n. 2, supra. The
structure of the statute offers no guidance as to purpose be-

A
..:..--

lrgislative uecisions . See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677,
743 (1979 (POWELL, J., di::;sentirg ).
u Some of our ca:>es ::;ugge;,;t that the actual purpose of a statute is
'iiTerev,mr,-Ft~ng v. Nestor, :363 U. S. 603, 612 (1960) , and that the ·
statute must be upheld " if any ~:<tat e of fa ct::; reasonably may be conceived to justify" its disc rimination , MrGowau v. Marylawl, :366 U. S.
420, 426 (1901)• Although thPsc r a;,es pre~ Prve an important caution,
tlwy do not d~ s~ibc the importance of actual Jegi::;lative purpose in our
analysis. We recognize that a legi::;lative body rarely acts with a l:iingle
mind and that compromis&; blur puqJol:ie. Therefore, it i ~ appropriate·
to accord ::;orne deferen<'c to the executive '::; view of legislative intPnt, as
~ imil a rly we accord deference to th<' con:;i<;tent con:,1:ruction of a l:itatute
by the administmti ve ageney cha rged with its pnforcement. E . g., Udall ·
v. Tallman, 380 U . S. 1, 16 (1965) . Ascerta in mPut of actual purpose to
t.he ext ent fPa!:iible, however, rPma ius an p::;sential ::;tep in Pqual protection.

-jo,c. vrr;"5

79-13RC-DISSENT
SCHWEIKER v. WILSON

7

cause § 1611 (e) is drawn in reference to the policies of
Medicaid rather than to the policies of SSI. By mechanically applyiug the criteria developed for Medicaid, Congress
appears to have avoided considering w·hat criteria would be
appropriate for deciding in which public institutions a person can reside and still be eligible for some SSI payment.
The importation of eligibility criteria from one statute to
another creates significant risks that irrational distinctions
r~;..._---...:.:
w:...:.il:.:.l..::b::.::e:....::made between equally needy people. See U.S. D. A.
v. Murr y, 413 U. S. 508, 514 (1973); Medora v. Colautti,
602 F . 2d 1149 (CA3 1979).
The Secretary argues, and the Court agrees, that the exclusion "is rationally related to the legitimate legislative
desire to avoid spending federal resources on behalf of individuals who~e care and treatment are being fully provided
for by state and local government units." Brief for Appellant 27. The Secretary does not argue that appellees are not
in present need of the comfort allowance; indeed, he concedes
"that the statutory classification does not exclude appellees
becal'se they were thought to be less needy." !d., at 32. 7
Nor does the Secretary suggests that because a State provides
health care and the necessities of life to inmates of mental
hospitals, the State also will provide the inmate with a comfort allowance. Indeed , the probability that a State will pay
a patient a comfort allowance does not increase when the
federal government refuses to relieve it of part of the cost of
the patient's medical care. The Court apparently recognizes
this, as it states that whether or not a State actually provides
a comfort allowance is irrelevant. Ante, at 16, n. 20. Appellees simply are denied a benefit provided to other institutionalized, disabled patients.
7

Thi:; conce:;:;ion make:; it difficul t to accept the Court's conclusion that
Congre:;s ra tionally could ha ve decided that "M edi CH id recipient;; in public
in;;titution::; .. . a re the mo;;t needy and the most deserving of the small
monthly supplement. " Ante, at 18.
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But, it is argued, Congress rationally could make the judg~
ment that the States should bear the responsibility for any
comfort allowance, because they already have the responsibility for providing treatment and minimal care. There is
U Y' r\t:
no logical link however, between these two res )Onsibilities.
:-J } - See U. S. D. A. v. ~, 413 U. S. i63(1973). Residence
in a public mental hQ"pital is ration;llv ~elated to whether
I f
the Congress should pay for the patient's treatment. Legion
b f-r-------..:.v..;... .:.:R:..:.ic:..:.·h.:.:a:.;,rd;;son, 354 F. Supp. 45 (SDNY). aff'd. sub norn. Leyion v. Weinberger, 4 4 . , . 1058 (1973). The judgment
whether the federal government should subsidize care for
the mentally ill in large public institutions involves difficult
questions of medical and economic policy. Supra, at - .
But. residence in a public mental iustitution, as opposed to
residence in a state medical hospital or a private mental hospital, bears no relation to any policy of the ssr program.
The monthly $25 allowance pays for small personal expenses,
beyond the minimal care and treatment provided by Medicaid or "other programs." H. R. Rep. No. 96-451 (Pt. 1),
96th Cong., 1st Sess., 153 (1979). If SSI pays a cash benefit relating to personal needs other than maintenance and
medical care, it is irrelevant whether the State or the Federal Government is paying for the maintenauce and medical
care; the patients' need remains the same, the likelihood
that the policies of SSI will be fulfilled remains the same.
I conclude that Congress had no rational reason for refusing to pay a comfort allowance to appellee, while paying it
to numerous otherwise identically situated disabled indigents.
This unexplained difference in treatment must have been 1..
legislative oversight. I therefore dissent.
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Richard Schweiker, Secretary of
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Appellant,
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Charles Edward Wilson et al.
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JusTICE PowELL, dissenting.
The Court holds that Congress rationally has denied ·a
small monthly "comfort allowance" to otherwise eligible people solely because previously it rationally denied them Medicaid benefits. In my view, Congress thoughtlessly has applied
a statutory classification developed to further legitimate goals
of one welfare program to another welfare program serving
entirely different needs. The result is an exclusion of wholly
dependent people from minimal benefits, serving no government interest. This irrational classification violates the
equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.
I
The Supplemental Security Income program (SSI) is a
comprehensive federal program of minimal cash welfare benefits for the indigent blind, aged and disabled. 86 Stat. 1465,
42 U. S. C. § 1381 et seq. Set> generally Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U. S. 170, 171 (1978). Section 1611 (e)(1)(A)
of the Act, 42 U.S. C.§ 1382 (e)(l)(A). operat!:'-S to reduce
substantially, to $25 per mo11th. the SST benefits available to
otherwise eligible persons who reside in public institutions.
The reason for this reduction of benefit is understandable:
"For these people most subsistence needs are met by the
institution and full benefits are not needed. Some pay-
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ment to these people, though, would be needed to enable
them to purchase small comfort items not supplied by
the institution." H. R. Rep. No. 92-231, p. 150 (1971).
See also S. Rep. No. 92-1230, p. 386 (1972). This comfort
allowance is provid!=ld to institution residents only if the
qualified person resiqes in a public hospital or institution that
receives Medicaid funds on his behalf. 42 U. S. C. § 1611
(e)(1)(B). Thus, no comfort allowance will be paid to an
individual unless the form of institutionalized treatment he
receives is compensible under the separate Medicaid program.
Appellees are indigent people disabled by mental illness,
and thus otherwise are eligible for SSI payments under 42
U. S. C. §§ 1382c (a) (3) (A), (C). As residents of public
mental institutions between the ages of 21 and 65, however,
they are ineligible to receive Medicaid benefits for their treatment. !d., § 1396a (a)(17)(B). 1 For this reason, and none
other, appellees may not receive the reduced monthly SSI
payments available to inmates of other medical institutions,
including patients in public medical hospitals and private
mental institutions. 2
The refusal to pay for treatment in public mental institutions has a lengthy history in the development of the federal
medical assistance programs. See Legion v. Richardson, 354
t Other classes of institutionalized people denied the reduced SSI allowance include patients in tubercular institutions and prison inmates.
• The Court too quickly dispa.tches the argument that § 1611 (e) classifies on the basis of mental illness. While it is true that not. all mentally
ill people are denied the benefit, and that some people denied the benefit
are not mentally ill, it is inescapable that appellees are denied tJ1e benefit
because they are patients in menta] inst.itutions. Only the mentally ill
are trea.ted in mental institutions. While I would agree that there is no
indication that Congress intended to punish or slight. the mentally ill, the
history of Medicaid demonstrates Congress' di~inclination to involve the
federal government in sta.te treatment of mental illnes~:; in public institution::;. See, infra, at - . Because I find the classification irrational, I
do not reach the question whether classification~:; drawn in part on the·
basis of mental health require heigbtencd scmtilly as appellees suggest ..
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F. Supp. 456 (SDNY), aff'd sub nom. Legion v. Weinoer17er,
414 U. S. 1058 ( 1973). Initially, Congress broadly refused
federal aid to individuals diagnosed as mentally ill, Pub. L.
81-734, ch. 809, §§ 303 (a), 343(a), 351, 64 Stat. 549, 554,
557-558 (1950). Subsequent enactments, however, have extended Medicaid coverage to treatment of mental illness in
public or private medical hospitals or nursing homes, 42
U. S. C. §§ 1396 (a)(1), (4) (1976 and 1978 Supp.) , fu :d
to treatment of mental illness of those under 25 and (, V.c'!'
65 in public mental institutious, id., §§ 1396d (a)(14), (16 ).
Moreover, Congress has defined "public institution" not to
include a publicly operated community residence center ser·ving no more than 16 residents. ld., at §1382(e)(l)(C).
Thus, federal medical benefits have been extended to the
mentally ill for treatment in various ·contexts. The residual exclusion of large state institutions for the mentally ill
from federal financial assistance rests on two related principles: States traditionally have assumed the burdens of administering this form of ca.re, and the federal government
has long distrusted the economic and therapeutic efficiency of
large mental institutions. See S. Rep. No. 404, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess., 20 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U. S. Code, Cong. &
Admin. News 1943, 2084. See also 42 U. S. C. § 1396d (h)
( 1)(B) (persons under 21 receive Medicaid benefits for treatment in mental institutions only when standards of utility
are met).
The legislative history of § 1611 (e) sheds no light on why
Congress made the exclusion from reduced SSI benefits coextensive with the exclusion from Medicaid payments. 3 The
Secretary argues that Congress might rationally have conThe only indication of Congressional intent states: "No assistance
benefits will be paid to an individual in a penal institution." H. R. Rep.
No. 92-231, 150 (1971). A ment.a.L ho:;pit<~l i:; not a penal institution.
Neither the Secretary nor the CoUJi a.rgues that the exclusion of appellees
from the comfort allowance rationally further:; this purpose.
1
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eluded tha.Y the States have the primary responsibility for
making payments of comfort allowances to appellees, because
they already bear the responsibility for paying for their treatment. Brief for Appellant 27. In accepting this justification, the Court adds that whether the States do, ever have, or
ever will provide this benefit to residents of large mental institutions is irrelevant to the rationality of Congress' supposed judgment. Ante, at i6, n. 20.

II
'A

Social and economic legislation that does not employ suspect classifications or impinge on fuudamental rights must
be upheld under the equal protection component of the Fifth
Amendment when the legislative means are rationally related
to a legitimate government purpoEe. U. S . Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, - U.S.- (1980). See San Antonio
School Board v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973); Dandridge
v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 (1970) . This simply stat2d test
holds two firmly established princij)les in tension. · The Court
must not substitute its view of wise or fair legislative policy
for that of the duly elected representatives of the people,
Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 109 (1979); Daudridye , supra,
at 485-486. but the equal protection requirement does place
'
a substantive limit on legislative power.
At a mi11imum, the
legislature cannot arbitrarily impose burdens on particular
classes of citizens. E . g., Johnson v. Robison, 415 U. S. 361,
374- 375 (1974); James v. Stranye, 407 U. S. 128, 140 (1972);
Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U. S. 164, 175
( 1972). Enforcing this prohibition while avoiding unwarranted incursions on the legislative power presents a difficult
task. No. bright line divides the merely foolish from the
arbitrary law. 4 Given this difficulty, legislation properly en~The Court has employed numercus formulations for the " rational
basis" te:st. U. S . Railroad R etirement Bd . v. Fritz, U. S. - , - ,
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joys a presumption of rationality, which is particularly strong
for welfare legislation where the apportionment of scarce benefits in accordance with complex criteria requires painful,
but unavoidable line drawing. Mathews v. De Castro, 429
U. S. 181, 185 (1976).
The deference to which legislative accommodation of conflicting interests is entitled rests in part upon the principle
that the political process of our majoritarian democracy responds to the wishes of the people. Accordingly, an important touchstone for equal protection review of statutes is how
readily a policy can be discerned which the legislature intended to serve. See, e. g., U.S. D. A. v. Moreno, 413 U.S.
528, 536-538 (1973); McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U. S. 263,
270 (1973). When a legitimate purpose for a statute appears
in the legislative history or is implicit in the statutory scheme
itself, a court has some assurance that the legislature has
made a conscious policy choice. Our democratic system requires that legislation intended to serve a discernable purpose
receive the most respectful deference. See Harris v. McRae,
- · U. S. (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U. S. 464, 479
(1977); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749 (1975). Yet,· the
question of whether a statutory classification discriminates
arbitrarily cannot be divorced from whether it was enacted
to serve an identifiable purpose. When a legislative purpose
can be suggested only by the ingenuity of a government lawyer litigating the constitutionality of a statute, a reviewing
court may be presented not so much with a legislative policy
choice as its absence.a
- , n. 10 (1980). Members of the Court continue to hold divergent
views on the clarity with which a Jegi~lative purpose must appear, see id.,
at (STEVENs, J., concurring) ; id, at (BRENNAN, J ., dissenting),
and about the degree of dderrence afforded the legislature in suiting
means to ends, compare Lindsley v. National Carbonic Gas Co ., 220 U. S.
61, 78-79 (1911), with Royster Guano Co . v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415
( 1920).
~ Congress' failure to make policy judgments can distort our system of
separation of powers by encouraging other branches to make essentially
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In my view, ~he Courf shpulfl rec~iye wi~h some skepticism
post hoc hypotheses about legislp.t~ve purpose, unsupported
by the legislative history. 6 When no inqication of legislative
purpose appears other than the cmrent position of the Secretary, the Court should require that the classification bear a
"fair and substantial relation" to the asserted purpose. See
Royster Guano v. Virginia, 253 U. S. 412, 415 (1920). This
marginally more demanding scrutiny indirectly would test
the plausibility of the tendered purpose, and preserve equal
protection review as something more than "a mere tautological recognition of the fact that Congress did what it intended to do." Fritz, supra, a t - (tlTJWEN~, J., concurriug).
B
Neither the structure of § 1611 nor its legislative history
identifies or even suggests any policy plausibly intended to
be served by denying appellees th~ smt:~,ll SSI allowance. As
noted above, the only pu~pose identified in the House and
Senate Reports is the irrelevant goal of depriving inmates
of penal institutions of all benefits. See n. 2, supra. The
structure of the statute offers no guidance as to purpose belegislative decisions. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677,
743 (1979 (POWELL, J., di::;senting).
6 Some of our cHses suggest that the actual purpose of a statute is
irrC'levant, Flemming Y. Nestor. 363 U. S. 60;~, (H2 ( 1H60), aud that the
statute must be upheld ''if any state of_ fact,.; reasonably may be conceived to justify" it:; discrimination, McGowa;'t \•. Maryland, 366 U. S.
420, 426 (19(il ). Although th~sE' C'a;E'::; J1rt•servp in i-mportant caution,
they do not d :· ::; ~ ribe the importance of actual legislative purpo.·e in our
analysis. We recognize that .a legislative body rarely acts with a single
mind and that compromises blur purpose. Therefore, it is appropriate
to accord some deference to the executive's view of lE>gi>'lative intent, a::;
~imilarly we accor.d deference to the cou~istent construction of a i:ltatute
by the administrative agency charged with it:; enforcement . E. g., Udall
v. Tallman, 380 U . S. 1, 16 (1965). Ascertainment of actual purpose to
the extent feasible , however, rei"llains an e:;sential step in equal JJr~tection.
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cause § 1611 (e) is drawn in reference to the policies of
Medicaid rather than to the policies of SSI. By mechanically applying the criteria developed for Medicaid, Congress
appears to have avoided considering what criteria would be
appropriate for deciding in which public institutions a person can reside and still be eligible for some SSI payment.
The importation of eligibility criteria from one statute to
another creates significant risks that irrational distinctions
will be made between equally needy people. See U.S. D. A.
v. Murry, 413 U. S. 508, 514 (1973); Medora v. Colautti,
602 F. 2d 1149 (CA3 1979).
The Secretary argues, and the Court agrees, that the exclusion "is rationally related to the legitimate legislative
desire to avoid spending federal resources on behalf of individuals whose care and treatment are beinp; fully provided
for by state and local government units." Brief for Appellant 27. The Secretary does not argue that appellees are not
in present need of the comfort allowance; indeed, he concedes
"that the statutory classification does not exclude appellees
becaese they were thought to be less needy." /d., at 32. 7
Nor does the Secretary suggests that because a State provides
health care and the necessities of life to inmates of mental
hospitals, the State also will provide the inmate with a comfort allowance. Indeed, the probability that a State will pay
a patient a comfort allowance does not increase when the
federal government refuses to relieve it of part of the cost of
the patient's medical care. The Court apparently recognizes
this, as it states that whether or not a State actually provides
a comfort allowance is irrelevant. Ante, at 16, n. 20. Appellees simply are denied a benefit provided to other institutionalized, disabled patients.
This conce::;~ion make::; it difficult to accept the Court's conclusion that
Congrei:IS rationally could have decided that "Medicaid recipient;; in public
in~titution::; ... are the most needy and the mo::,1 deserving of the snralf
monthly supplement." Ante, at 18'.
1
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But, it is a.rgued, Congress rationally could ma.ke the judgment that the States should bear the responsibility for any
comfort allowance, because they already have the responsibility for providing treatment and minimal care. There is
no logical link, however, between these two responsibilities.
See U. S. D. A. v. Murry, 413 U. S. 508 (1973) . Residence
in a public mental hospital is rationally related to whether
the Congress should pay for the patient's treatment. Legion
v. Richardson, 354 F. Supp. 456 (SDNY), aff'd, sub nom. Legion v. Weinberger, 414 U. S. 1058 (1973). The judgment
whether the federal government should subsidize care for
the mentally ill in large public institutions involves difficult
questions of medical and economic policy. Supra, at - .
But, residence in a public mental institution, as opposed to
residence in a state medical hospital or a private mental hospital, bears no relation to any policy of the SSI program.
The monthly $25 allowance pays for small personal expenses,
beyond the minimal care and treatment provided by Medicaid or "other programs." H. R. Rep. No. 96-451 (Pt. 1),
96th Cong., 1st Sess. , 153 (1979). If SSI pays a cash benefit relating to personal needs other than maintenance and
medical care, it is irrelevant whether the State or the Federal Government is paying for the maintenance and medical
care; the patients' need remains the same, the likelihood
that the policies of SSI will be fulfilled remains the same.
I conclude that Congress had no rational reason for refusing to pay a comfort allowance to appellee, while paying it
to numerous otherwise identically situated disabled indigents.
This unexplained difference in treatment must have been a
legislative oversight. : I therefore dissent.
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Richard Schweiker, Secretary of
On Appeal from the United
-·Health and Human Services,
States District Court for
Appellant,
the Northern District of
v.
Illinois.
Charles Eqw~rd Wilson et al.
[February -, 1981]
JusncE PowELL, with whom JusTICE BmmNAN, Jus'l'ICE (
MARSHALL, and JusTICE STEVENS join, dissenting.
The Court holds that Congress rationally has denied a
small monthly "comfort allowance" to otherwise eligible pea~
pie solely because previously it rationally denied them Medicaid benefits. In my view, Congress thoughtlessly has applied
a statutory classification developed to further legitimate goals
of one welfare program to another welfare program serving
entirely different needs. The result is an exclusion of wholly
dependent people from minimal benefits, serving no government interest. This irrational classification violates the
equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of tho
Fifth Amenqment,
I
The Supplemental Security Income program (SSI) is a
comprehensive federal program of minimal cash welfare benefits for the indigent blind, aged and disabled. 86 Stat. 1465,
42 U. S. C. § 1381 et seq. See generally Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170, 171 (1978). Section 1611 (e)(l)(A)
of the Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1382 (e) (1) (A). operates to reduce
substantially, to $25 per month, the SSI benefits available to
otherwise eligible persons who reside in public institutions.
The reason for this reduction of benefit is understandable:
"For these people most subsistence needs are met by the
institution and full benefits are not needed. Some pay-
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ment to these people, though, would be needed to enable
them to purchase small comfort items not supplied by
the institution." H . R. Rep. No. 92-231, p. 150 (1971).
See also S. Rep. No. 92-1230, p. 386 (1972). This comfort
allowance is provided to institution residents only if the
qualified person resides in a public hospital or institution that
receives Medicaid funds on his behalf. 42 U. S. C. § 1611
(e)(1)(B). Thus, no comfort allowance will be paid to an
individual unless the form of institutionalized treatment he
receives is compensible under the separate Medicaid program.
Appellees are indigent people disabled by mental illness.
and thus otherwise are eligible for SST payments under 42
U. S. C. §§ 1382c (a) (3) (A), (C). As residents of public
mental institutions between the ages of 21 and 65, however,
they are ineligible to receive Medicaid benefits for their treatment. Id., § 1396a (a)(17)(B). 1 For this reason, and none
other, appellees may not receive the reduced monthly ssr
payments available to inmates of other medical institutions,
including patients in public medical hospitals and private
mental institutions.2
The refusal to pay for treatment in public mental institutions has a lengthy history in the development of the federal
medical assistance programs. See Legion v. Richardson, 354
1 Other classes of institutionalized people denied the reduced SSI allowance include patients in tubercular institutions and prison inmates.
2 The Court too quickly dispa.tches the argument that. § 1611 (e) classifies on the basis of mental illness. While it is true that not all mentally
ill people are denied the benefit. and that some people denied the benefit
~~tre not mentally i!J, it is inescapable that appellees are denied the benefit
because they are patients in mental ins1itutions. Only the mentally ill
are treated in mental institutions. While I would agree that there is 110
indication that Congress intended to punish or slight. the mentally ill, the
history of Medicaid demonstrates Congress' disinclination to involve the
federal government in state treatment of mental illness in public institutions. See, infra, at - . BecauAe I find the classification irrational, I
do not reach the que;,;tion whether classificationi:l drawn in part on thl:t
basis or mental health require he~ghtened scrutiny as appellees suggest,
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'F. Supp. 456 (SDNY), a:ff'd sub nom. Legion v. Weinberger,
414 U. S. 1058 (1973). Initially, Congress broadly refused
federal aid to individuals diagnosed as mentally ill, Pub. L.
81-734, ch. 809, §§ 303 (a), 343(a), 351, 64 Stat. 549, 554,
557-558 (1950). Subsequent enactments, however, have extended Medicaid coverage to treatment of mental illness in
public or private medical hospitals or nursing homes, 42
U. S. C. §§ 1396 (a)(1), ( 4) (1976 and 1978 Supp.), and
to treatment of mental illness of those under 21 and over \
65 in public mental institutions, id., §§ 1396d (a) (14), (16).
Moreover, Congress has defined "public institution" not to
include a publicly operated community residence center serving no more than 16 residents. !d., at § 1382 (e)(1)(C).
Thus, federal medical benefits have been extended to the
mentally ill for treatment in various contexts. The residual exclusion of large state institutions for the mentally ill
from federal financial assistance rests on two related principles: States traditionally have assumed the burdens of administering this form of care, and the federal government
has long distrusted the economic and therapeutic efficiency of
large mental institutions. See S. Rep. No. 404, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess., 20 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U. S. Code, Cong. &
Admin. News 1943, 2084. See also 42 U. S. C. § 1396d (h)
(l)(B) (persons under 21 receive Medicaid benefits for treatment in mental institutions only when standards of utility
are met).
The legislative history of § 1611 (e) sheds no light on why
Congress made the exclusion from reduced SSI benefits coextensive with the exclusion from Medicaid payments. 3 The
Secretary argues that Congress might rationally have con1

The only indication of Congressional intent stares: "No Msistance
benefits will be paid to au individual in a penal institution." H. R. Rep,
No. 92-231, 150 (1971). A mental hospital is not a penal institution.
Neither the Secretary nor the Court argues that the exclusion of appellees:
from the cotnfort allowance rationally furthers this purpose.
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eluded that the States have the primary responsibility for
making payment~ of comfort allowances to appellees, because
they already bear the responsibility for paying for their treatment. Brief for Appellant 27. In accepting this justification, the Court adds that whether the States do, ever have, or:
ever will provide this benefit to residents of large mental institutions is irrelevfl'nt fO the rationality of Congress' sup~
posed judgment. Ante, at lp, n. 20.

II
A

Social and economic leg~slation that does not employ suspect classifications or i~pinge on fundamental rights must
be upheld under the equal protection component of the Fifth"
Amendment when the legislative means are rationally related
to a legitimate government purpoE:e. U. S. Railroad Retire..,
ment Board v. Fritz, U.S. (1980). See San Antonia
School Board v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973); Dandridge.
v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 (1970). This simply stakd test
holds two firmly established principles in tension. The Court
must not substitute its view of wise or fair legislative policy
for that of the duly elected representatives of the people 1
Vance v. Bradley, 440 U. S. 93, 109 (1979); Dandridge, supra,
at 485- 486, but the equal protection requirement does place
3 substantive limit on legislative power. At a minimum, the
legislature cannot arbitrarily discriminate among citizens.
E . g., Johuson V. RobisOil, 415 u.-S. 361 , 374- 375 (1974);
James v. Strange, 407 F . S. 128, 140 ( 1972); Weber v. Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co ., 406 U. S. 164, 175 ( 1972). Enforcing
this prohibition while avoidiug unwarranted incursions on the
legislative power presents a difficult task. No bright line
divides the merely foolish from the arbitrary law.< Giveu
' The Court. has employed numerous formulations for the "rational
basis" te:;t. U. S Ratlroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, U. S. - , - ,,
- , n. 10 ( 1950}. ~!ember" of the Court continue to hold divergent
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this difficulty , legislation properly enjoys a presumption of
rationality, which is particularly strong for welfare legislation
where the apportionment of scarce benefits in accordance with
complex criteria requires painful, but unavoidable line drawing. Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U.S. 181, 185 (1976)
The deference to which legislative accommodation of conflicting interests is entitled rests in part upon the principle
that the political process of our majoritarian democracy responds to the wishes of the people. Accordingly, an important touchstone for equal protection review of statutes is how
readily a policy can be discerned which the legislature intended to serve. See, e. g., U.S. D. A. v. Moreno, 413 U.S.
528, 536-538 (1973); McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U. S. 263,
270 (1973). When a legitimate purpose for a statute appears
in the legislative history or is implicit in the statutory scheme
itself, a court has some assurance that the legislature has
made a conscious policy choice. Our democratic system requires that legislation intended to serve a discernable purpose
receive the most respectful deference. See Harris v. McRae,
- · U. S. (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U. S. 464, 479
( 1977); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749 (1975). Yet, the
question of whether a statutory classification discriminates
arbitrarily cannot be divorced from whether it was enacted
to serve an identifiable purpose. When a legislative purpose
can be suggested only by the ingenuity of a government lawyer litigating the constitutionality of a statute, a reviewing
court may be presented not so much with a legislative policy
choice as its absence. 3
views on the clarity with which a legi81ative purpose must appear, see id .,
(8'1'EVENt>, J ., concurring); id, at (BRENNAN, J ., dissenting) ,
a nd abo ut the degree of deferrence afforded the legislature in :ouiting
means to ends , compare Lindsley v. National Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S.
61, 78-79 (1911), with Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415
( 1920).
1 Congress' failure tQ make policy judgments can distort our system of
~-eparation of powers by encouraging other branches to make essentially

at -
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In my view, the Court should receive with some skepticism
post hoc hypotheses about legislative purpose, unsupported
by the legislative history.~ When no indication of legislative
purpose appears other than the current position of the Secretary, the Court should require that the classification bear a
"fair and substantial relation" to the asserted purpose. See
Royster Guano v. Virginia, 253 U. S. 412, 415 (1920) . This
marginally more demanding scrutiny indirectly would test
the plausibility of the tendered purpose, and preserve equal
protection review as something more than "a mere tautological recognition of the fact that Congress did what it il1(STEVENS, J., concurring) .
tended to do.'' Fritz, supra, at -

B
either the structure of ~ 1611 nor its legislative history
identifies or even suggests any policy plausibly intended to
be served by denying appellees the small SSI allowance. As
noted above, the only purpose identified in the House and
Senate Reports is the irrelevant goal of depriving inmates
of penal institutions of all benefits. See n. 2, supra. The
8tructure of the statute offers no guidance as to purpose belegislative decisions. See Cannon v University of Chicago, 441 U S. 677,
743 (197() (POWELL , J ., dlssentiPg ) .
6 Some of our case5 suggest that the actual purpo~e of a statute is
irrelevant, Ftemrmng v Nestor, ;l63 U S 603, 612 (1950) , and that the
statute must be upheld "if any state of fact~ reasonably may be conceived to JUStlfy" 1ts discrimmation, McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S.
420, 426 (1961) . Although these cas~:; preserve in important caution,
the. do not d ~ ~:~mbe the importance of actual leg1slative purpose in our
analys,~ . We recognize that a legi::;Jative body rarely acts with a ::;ingle
mind and that compromises blur purpo;,e. Therefore, it IS appropriate
to accord some deference to the executive's view of legislative intent, a;,
similarly we tLccord deference to the contistent construction of a statute
by the admm1strat1Ve agency charged w1th Its enforcement. E. g., Udall
v l'allman, 380 U. S. I . 15 (19ti5) . Ascertainment of actual purpose to
the PXtent ff'a:Slbl~-' howf'Vf'' r Prull1D8 an es~entw.l step in equal protection •
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l:&UsL· ~ loll (e ) is drawu in reference to the policies of
Medicaid rather than to the policies of SSI. By mechani~
cally applylllg the criteria developed for Medicaid, Congress
appears to have avoided considering what criteria would be
appropriate for deciding in which public institutions a person can reside and still be eligible for some SSI payment.
The importation of eligibility critena from one statute to
another creates significant risks that irrational distinctions
will be made between equally needy people. See U. S. D. A.
" Murry, 413 U . S. 508, .114 ( Hl7!3) : Medora v Cnlauft?,
602 F 2d U49 (CA3 l978 L
The Secretary argues , and the Court agrees, that the ex du::mm · It'. rationally related to the legttimate legtslative
desire Lu avoid spemhng tederal t•esources on behalf of indlviduab who:::e care and treatment are bemg fully proVllkd
for by stalk and local govemnH~llt units. 1 Bnef for Appdlant 27 l'he Secretary does uot argue that appellees are uot
in present need o1 the comfort allowance ; indeed, he coneedt:·s
·'thaL the :;tatutory classification dues not exclude appellees
bE>caPse they were thought to be less needy .' ld., at :3:2
Nor· rloe::, Lhe Secretary suggest that becaus€ a ,State proviclet- \
h<~alth care and Lhe ueces:sities uf hfe to inmate& oi meutal
hospitals, tlw State also Will prov1de the inmate with a com·
forL allowance
lndeed , the probability t.hat a Statt' will pay
a patient a comfort allowance doe& not increase when the
federal government refuse::. lo relieve lt of part of the cosL of
the patient 's medical eare . fhp Court apparenLly recognizes
this a& it states that whether or nut a State actually provide!~
a eomfort allowance 1::, nrelevant Ant!' , at lb, n. 20. Ap~·
pellees simply ar e denied a benefit vrovided t.o other instit.utlonahzed rhsabl~·~i pattellt..::,.
; Tni,-
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But, it i:o. argued, Congress rationally could make the judgment. that the States should bear the responsibility for any
comfort allowance, because they already have the responsibility for providing treatment and minimal care. There is
no logical link. however, between these two responsibilities.
Ree ('. S. D A . v. Murru, 413 F. S. 508 (1973). Residence
in a pubhc mental hospital i's rationally related to whether
the C'ongres::. should pay for the patient's treatment. Legion
v. Richardson, 354 F Supp. 456 (SDNY). aff'd. sub nom. Legiun \ Weinberyer, 414 L". S. 1058 (1973). The judgment
whether the fetleral govemlllen t should subsidize care for
the mentally il1 iu large pubhc iust1tutions involves difficult.
quel:ltiont~ of rnedtea1 aud economic policy. Supra, at - .
But. rel:lidence iu a publ~c mental institution. ru:; opposed to
resideuce Ill a state med1cal hospital ur a private mental hospital, bear::. uo relatJOH to any (JOhcy of the SSI program.
Tht mouthly $25 allowance pays for small personal expeuses,
beyond the miuimal care and Lreatmeut provided by Medicaid or "other prograru::. ' H. R Rep. No. 96-451 (Pt. 1) ,
.J6th Cong 1st :-5e:sb, 1<>3 ( 197!:.1) If SSI pays a cash bene~
fi.t relating tu per::.oual need:s other than maintenance and
mediea1 care, it i::. irrelevaut ~hether the Stat€ or the Fed~'ral Government is pl:l,ylllg for the mamtenance and medical
care· the patieuts' need remam::. the same, the likelihood
th l:l,t the pohcies of SSI w1ll be fulhlled remains the same.
f conclude Lhat C01•gre::;::. had no rational reason for refusin g t pay a cwufort allowance to appellee, while paying it
to numetoub otherwr::.e IdentiCally situated disabled indigents.
Thi::: unexplaiued drfterence in treatment must have · been .a
lt>!!.IHJar,lVf
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